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Abstract
We develop a unique global dataset on methane inventories derived from produc-
tion, final production, and consumption for 1997–2011. Anthropogenic emissions are
quantitatively important for global warming and have increased about 25% from 1997–
2011. We analyze the drivers of methane emissions per capita, both economy-wide
and across sectors, paying attention to the form of the relation between emissions and
growth. There is relative decoupling between methane and growth, and the relation-
ship is non-linear. The effect of economic growth on emissions is likely to worsen when
moving from lower to middle levels of development, and only improves as countries
reach high levels of income. There is substantial heterogeneity in this relationship at a
sectoral level, and sectoral transformation accompanying economic growth also leads
to increased emissions. Together, relative decoupling and sectoral diversity challenge
the design and implementation of environmental instruments to mitigate methane
emissions. Methane also poses challenges to the overall management of greenhouse
gas levels.
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1 Introduction
Methane (CH4) is one of the most important greenhouse gases (GHGs). Anthropogenic
methane emissions are responsible for about 20% of the warming induced by long-lived
GHGs since pre-industrial times, making it the second largest contributor to climate ra-
diative forcing after Carbon Dioxide (CO2; EPA, 2012). Methane has significant warming
potential, notably in the beginning of its atmospheric life, and there is evidence of a strong
and mostly coincident linkage between methane emissions and global temperature trends
(Estrada et al., 2013).
Atmospheric methane concentrations result from a mix of natural and anthropogenic
sources.1 Methane concentrations from anthropogenic sources experienced an exponential
increase in the late 1970s and sustained growth in the 1980s, followed by a slowdown
during the 1990s and a general stabilization from 1999 until 2006. Since 2006 atmospheric
methane levels have started to rise again (Kirschke et al., 2013). Estrada et al. (2013)
identify two main causes of the slow-down in warming since the mid-1990s, which highlight
the impact of human behavior in global warming. The first is the reduction in chlorofluo-
rocarbon (CFC) emissions as a result of the Montreal Protocol (1989). The second is lower
anthropogenic methane emissions, possibly caused by a decrease in microbial sources re-
sulting from the use of chemical fertilizers and more efficient water use for rice production
in Asia.
Despite its importance, methane has neither been a primary focus in recent economic and
political debate on greenhouse gas regulation, nor has it been among the main targets of
environmental policies. National methane regulations exist in some countries, but inter-
national cooperation in the reduction of methane is largely missing. While the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (1997) was meant to limit emissions of CO2 and five other GHGs including methane
(measured in CO2 equivalents), binding emission reduction targets are small and confined
to Annex I members of the protocol2 (i.e. developed economies), providing substantial
room for emission leakage. Furthermore, the protocol has not introduced mechanisms to
change the behavior of the countries bound by emission targets of its Annex I (Barret,
2008), while the enforcement of compliance with these targets has also been problematic
1 Kirschke et al. (2013) group sources of CH4 emissions into two natural sources (natural wetland and other
natural emissions) and three anthropogenic sources (agriculture and waste, fossil fuels, and biomass and
biofuel burning). During the 2000-2009 period, natural wetland emissions and agriculture and waste
emissions were the main sources of methane emissions, followed by anthropogenic fossil fuel emissions,
other natural emissions, and emissions from biomass and biofuel burning.
2 The Annex I countries were originally defined by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). In the Kyoto Protocol emission targets for the Annex I countries were determined,
with the exception of Turkey, and enshrined in the Annex B of the protocol. For the rest of the paper
we stick to the term Annex I countries.
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(see Nentjes and Klaassen, 2004, Hagem et al., 2005, Feaver and Durrant, 2008, Aichele
and Felbermayr, 2012).
Compared to the extensive economic literature on CO2 emissions, the literature analyzing
the socio-economic factors driving methane emissions is relatively scarce. The approach
has largely been cross-sectional (Burns et al., 1997, Rosa et al., 2004, Jorgenson, 2006),
leaving room to omitted variable bias, or has only covered a small set of countries us-
ing unbalanced panel data (Jorgenson and Birkholz, 2010). These studies support the
idea that national emissions increase with population and economic growth and depend
on the sectoral composition of an economy. However, they do not account for the po-
tential endogeneity of key variables (such as economic growth) and, noteworthy, do not
engage in sectoral analysis of methane emissions. Also, these studies have focussed only
on production-based emissions, what seems too narrow, since the link between national
production and consumption patterns has been weakened by the recent trend of globaliza-
tion of production chains. We address these issues by comprehensively investigating the
economic determinants of methane footprints, taking into account global value chains and
trade linkages.3
Our contributions in this paper are threefold. First, we develop a global panel dataset of
national inventories of methane emissions embodied in standard (territorial) production,
final production, and consumption activities. In the context of global supply chains and
vertical specialization, the attribution of responsibilities in international environmental
agreements and the determination of national policy targets and instruments must account
for international linkages and potential for outsourcing. Our dataset takes into account
cross-border linkages in production and provides valuable information about national (and
sectoral) responsibility for emissions at three stages of the supply chain. Second, with these
data we conduct economy-wide and sector-specific analyses, capturing the heterogeneity
in the sources of methane emissions, which reflect diverse socio-economic drivers including
economic development. At the sectoral level, this heterogeneity will determine the scope
for mitigation through efficiency gains, which in turn depends on the existence of cleaner
alternatives to current (dirty) inputs in the production function, the elasticity of substitu-
tion between clean and dirty inputs, and the technological gap between established, dirty
technologies and their new, cleaner counterparts. These factors will differ across sectors.4
3 Subak (1995) highlights the importance of accounting for methane embodied in international trade.
4 Acemoglu et al. (2012) highlighted the role of the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty inputs
and the level of development of clean relative to dirty technologies in the relationship between economic
growth and pollution. A higher elasticity of substitution between the two classes of inputs or a lower
technology gap between clean and dirty production technologies make it possible to prevent pollution
without dramatically compromising growth. The potential for development of new technologies will
depend on the research and development (R&D) investments of private agents in response to market
incentives (preferences for cleaner production). These investments in turn depend on the prospects of
economic growth.
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At the macroeconomic level, structural (sectoral) transformation associated with economic
growth will be responsible for some of the effects of economic development on aggregate
methane emissions. Finally, we explore in detail the relationship between economic devel-
opment and methane emissions, also allowing for potential nonlinearities.
Our data provide comparable national methane emissions inventories based on territo-
rial production, final production and consumption activities. The dataset is built from
underlying data covering 187 economies, grouped into 78 countries and regions and 57
sectors, for the years 1997, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2011. Following the recent literature
on international value chains, methane inventories are calculated based on multi-regional
input-output (MRIO) analysis (Koopman et al., 2014; Ferna´ndez-Amador et al., 2017).
This means that we extend territorial national production inventories, by tracing emissions
embodied in intermediate input flows to compute emissions embodied in final production.
We also map emissions embodied in trade flows of final goods and services in order to
calculate final consumption emissions inventories. Based on these comparable inventories,
we identify a number of stylized facts regarding methane emissions worldwide and assess
the determinants of economy-wide and sector-specific methane emissions per capita.
We identify four main stylized facts. First, methane mitigation is important for climate
change control, especially in the short-term—anthropogenic methane emissions are equiv-
alent to between 25% and 84% of the warming potential of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel
combustion, depending on whether we use a 100-year or a 20-year basis to compute the
equivalence, and increased 25% during 1997–2011. Second, developing countries account
for the largest part of anthropogenic CH4 emissions. While high-income countries were
able to reduce per-capita emissions between 1997 and 2011, the emissions from developing
countries have increased despite considerable gains in CH4 efficiency. Third, high income
countries show net-imports of emissions embodied in goods and services, which are divided
in intermediate and final products alike. Finally, there are important differences across
sectors concerning the contributions of value added growth and methane efficiency gains,
which are likely to affect transaction costs related to environmental regulation.
The econometric results point to a robust, significant and positive effect of economic
growth on methane emissions per capita. This relationship is non-linear, characterized
by threshold effects. One threshold determines a reduction in the income elasticity of
emissions at very high income levels. There is also some less robust evidence for another
threshold effect capturing an increase in the income elasticity at lower income levels.
Moreover, we detect substantial sectoral heterogeneity concerning the determinants of
emissions and the functional form of the income elasticity of methane. Overall, the mix of
linear and threshold models found at the sectoral level determines the non-linear patterns
detected economy-wide. The livestock sector, but also the transport sector for production
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inventories, underlie the threshold effect identified at very high levels of development,
while the energy, manufacturing, and public administration (waste management) sectors
seem to determine the threshold estimated at lower development levels. Notably, more
than 40% of total methane emissions are not significantly affected by income per capita.
Furthermore, sectoral transformation accompanying economic growth seems to increase
methane emissions per capita.
Our results question that preferences for cleaner environment lower methane emissions in
more democratic and developed countries. They also highlight the ineffectiveness of the
Kyoto Protocol in limiting global CH4 emissions. Although Annex I ratification has led
to a reduction in emissions on the production side, notably from the energy and public
administration sectors, we also observe an increase in emissions derived from final pro-
duction and consumption inventories in Annex I countries, particularly in the agriculture,
service and transport sectors. Additionally, openness to international trade is connected to
higher emissions from production, what may be driven by methane leakage. Basically, for
any climate change mitigation policy to be effective, the existence of international trade
linkages needs to be taken into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of
methane emission inventories and stylized facts for the period 1997–2011. Section 3 dis-
cusses potential socio-economic drivers of methane emissions and outlines our econometric
strategy. Section 4 presents the economy-wide and sector specific results. We conclude in
Section 5.
2 Stylized facts of national emission inventories
We compute a consistent panel of sectoral methane emissions inventories based on ter-
ritorial production, final production and consumption activities. This dataset comprises
emission inventories for 57 sectors of 78 regions, for the years 1997, 2001, 2004, 2007 and
2011.5
Our dataset extends the territorial, production-based dataset of methane emissions devel-
oped by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).6 First, we generate national (stan-
dard, territorial) production-based emission inventories, which are comparable over time.
5 A detailed explanation of the methodology to construct the emission inventories based on territorial
production, final production and consumption activities can be found in Appendix A. An overview of
the regions and sectors covered is available in Table B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.
6 See Rose and Lee (2008), Rose et al. (2010), Ahmed et al. (2014), Irfanoglu and van der Mensbrugghe
(2015). The GTAP CH4 emissions data cannot be used in a panel framework, since the sources of raw
data and/or the methodology for data construction differ across GTAP releases and do not exist for
1997. Also, GTAP yearly releases consist only of methane emissions based on territorial production.
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For that purpose, we map methane emissions from the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) of the United Nations and statistics from the Emission Database for Global
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) to the 57 sectors of the 78 regions covered. Territorial
emission inventories constitute the standard measure of national emissions relevant for
multilateral agreements on emissions reduction such as the Kyoto Protocol.
After that, we apply multi-regional input-output (MRIO) techniques to construct invento-
ries of emissions embodied in final production and final consumption activities (footprint
measures). Final production inventories collect all emissions embodied in intermediate in-
puts used in the production of final goods and assign them to the country and sector that
produces the final good (supply-side of final products). Consumption-based inventories,
by contrast, reflect the demand-side for final products and allocate emissions embodied in
the consumption of products from specific sectors to the country in which consumption
takes place. To derive these inventories, we combine our territorial production emission
inventories with input-output and trade data to construct a global intermediate input
requirements matrix. We create an environmentally extended MRIO table by scaling the
global requirements matrix to CH4 emissions and calculate the environmentally extended
Leontief-inverse matrix, which collects the direct and indirect CH4 requirements for a
given unit of output per sector and region. We finally derive the final production and
consumption based national inventories.
2.1 Global sources of methane and national emission inventories
Table 1 presents the total amount of anthropogenic methane emissions released during
the period 1997–2011 in warming potential equivalent to CO2 emissions from fossil fuel
combustion, computed by Ferna´ndez-Amador et al. (2016), using two alternative time
frames. Although methane has a relatively short atmospheric life-time, 12.4 years, its
global warming potential is 72 times that of CO2 (by equivalent mass) over a 20-year
period and 21 times over a 100-year time frame, respectively (IPCC, 2007). The table
indicates that although anthropogenic methane emissions are equivalent to 25% of CO2
emissions on a 100-year basis, they are only somewhat lower (84%) than the warming
potential of CO2 emissions over a 20-year period. In addition, global methane emissions
increased by 25% between 1997 and 2011. In this sense, methane mitigation is important
for climate change control, especially in the short-term.7
Figure 1 shows the contribution of the 57 sectors to global methane emissions embodied
in territorial production (upper graph) and final production and consumption patterns
7 Methane also contributes to thermal expansion of the ocean over much longer time scales than its
atmospheric life-time (Zickfeld et al., 2017).
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CH4 (CO2e, 100y) CH4 (CO2e, 20y) CO2
Mt % of CO2 Mt % of CO2 Mt
1997 5862.41 25.82 20099.68 88.54 22701.79
2001 5999.47 26.02 20569.60 89.22 23054.30
2004 6410.75 24.28 21979.73 83.25 26403.22
2007 6800.65 23.35 23316.50 80.07 29121.03
2011 7313.50 23.61 25074.85 80.96 30971.11
Table 1: Global CH4 and CO2 emissions. Note: CO2e, 100y and CO2e, 20y stand for CO2 equivalents
based on a global warming potential over 100 and 20 years, using the conversion factors of 21 and 72,
respectively (IPCC, 2007). CO2 data are available from Ferna´ndez-Amador et al. (2016).
(lower graph) as calculated in our database. Production-based emissions are concentrated
in relatively few sectors, which correspond to very heterogeneous economic processes such
as livestock breeding (34.7%), drilling and transportation of fossil fuels (25.1%), public
administration (19.9%, which is mainly waste management), and rice cultivation (7.8%).
Footprint-based emissions, by contrast, are spread across sectors more evenly as a result
of domestic and international inter-sectoral supply-chain relations. Particularly, much of
the methane produced by rice cultivation and livestock breeding is used in food processing
sectors, while emissions from fossil fuel drilling are mainly used by industrial activities
and transportation services.
Table 2 reports a summary of the three CH4 inventories for the most important producers
and consumers of methane emissions, which taken together represent roughly 80% of
produced emissions between 1997 and 2011, and for the four income groups as defined by
the World Bank. The first six columns report total CH4 emissions in megatons (Mt) of
CO2 equivalents and as world shares for each emission inventory.
8 The last four columns
summarize CH4 emissions per capita (in tons) and per value added (as kg per USD) for
production- and consumption-based inventories.9
The bulk of anthropogenic methane emissions is concentrated in developing economies, es-
pecially in the upper and lower-middle income groups. Together, these groups accounted
for 72% of produced and 64% of consumed CH4 in 1997.
10 The dynamics of emissions
between 1997 and 2011 were very different for developed and developing economies. Emis-
sions in developing countries grew considerably for all three methane inventories, especially
in upper-middle income countries, which include the BRIC countries Brazil, Russia and
China, and in low-income countries. For the high income group, by contrast, CH4 emis-
8 CO2 equivalents of methane are based on a global warming potential (GWP) over 100 years; this
equivalence is commonly used in the literature.
9 Pollution intensity (efficiency) is often measured in pollution per GDP. We opt for a value added based
measure in order to align the definition of the economic aggregate and the flux of methane emissions
derived from it.
10 This contrasts with data for CO2 releases from fossil fuel combustion, where most of the emissions are
released by developed economies (see Ferna´ndez-Amador et al., 2016).
6
Figure 1: Sector shares of global CH4 emissions, three inventories (average 1997–2011).
The barplots show CH4 emissions associated with production (upper plot) and consumption and final
production (lower plot) in each of the 57 sectors as share of global methane emissions. On a global level
methane emissions associated with final production and final consumption are equal. For a definition of
sector-abbreviations and for the assignment of each sector to the broad sectors represented by the different
colors, see Table B.2 in Appendix B.
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Total CH4∗ CH4 pc∗ CH4 per VA∗
production final prod. consumption prod. cons. prod. cons.
(Mt) (shr.) (Mt) (shr.) (Mt) (shr.) (t per capita) (kg/USD)
1997
High Income 1496.75 25.53 1882.10 32.10 2009.19 34.27 1.52 2.04 0.07 0.10
Australia 117.30 2.00 86.90 1.48 71.41 1.22 6.35 3.86 0.33 0.20
EU 15 471.63 8.04 659.80 11.25 712.22 12.15 1.27 1.92 0.07 0.10
EEU 156.15 2.66 160.88 2.74 155.46 2.65 1.46 1.45 0.56 0.50
USA 571.54 9.75 657.94 11.22 714.18 12.18 2.16 2.70 0.07 0.09
Upper Middle 2433.79 41.52 2174.01 37.08 2092.06 35.69 1.10 0.94 0.62 0.53
Brazil 289.14 4.93 301.21 5.14 301.16 5.14 1.79 1.86 0.39 0.40
Russia 444.11 7.58 332.37 5.67 334.54 5.71 3.02 2.28 1.16 0.88
China 868.77 14.82 799.34 13.64 731.02 12.47 0.71 0.60 1.23 1.03
Mexico 94.60 1.61 94.47 1.61 94.08 1.60 1.00 0.99 0.27 0.28
Middle East 200.17 3.41 138.32 2.36 142.80 2.44 1.27 0.91 0.44 0.31
Lower Middle 1812.98 30.93 1689.48 28.82 1647.58 28.10 0.76 0.69 1.27 1.11
Former SU 211.47 3.61 187.60 3.20 170.80 2.91 1.53 1.24 1.93 1.50
India 552.82 9.43 550.69 9.39 540.87 9.23 0.58 0.56 1.57 1.51
Indonesia 153.50 2.62 141.32 2.41 143.01 2.44 0.76 0.71 0.79 0.74
RSA 112.63 1.92 112.02 1.91 109.89 1.87 0.64 0.63 1.85 1.70
SSA 362.86 6.19 316.47 5.40 309.12 5.27 0.90 0.77 2.43 2.02
Low Income 118.89 2.03 116.81 1.99 113.58 1.94 0.57 0.54 1.75 1.58
2011
High Income 1330.18 18.19 1862.66 25.47 1971.02 26.95 1.23 1.83 0.05 0.08
Australia 152.85 2.09 96.35 1.32 83.18 1.14 6.84 3.72 0.26 0.14
EU 15 377.51 5.16 641.30 8.77 678.23 9.27 0.94 1.69 0.05 0.09
EEU 134.10 1.83 151.88 2.08 149.93 2.05 1.32 1.47 0.28 0.28
USA 486.94 6.66 619.17 8.47 681.79 9.32 1.56 2.19 0.05 0.07
Upper Middle 3453.37 47.22 3122.14 42.69 3036.25 41.52 1.36 1.20 0.44 0.38
Brazil 407.19 5.57 394.44 5.39 387.11 5.29 2.07 1.97 0.40 0.37
Russia 549.30 7.51 368.27 5.04 372.21 5.09 3.84 2.60 1.04 0.66
China 1451.27 19.84 1426.06 19.50 1308.10 17.89 1.08 0.97 0.51 0.45
Mexico 108.54 1.48 107.26 1.47 109.31 1.49 0.91 0.92 0.18 0.18
Middle East 335.29 4.58 220.58 3.02 256.35 3.51 1.52 1.16 0.35 0.29
Lower Middle 2360.64 32.28 2167.21 29.63 2147.30 29.36 0.77 0.70 0.85 0.73
Former SU 256.67 3.51 201.26 2.75 196.90 2.69 1.84 1.41 1.18 0.91
India 658.59 9.01 666.90 9.12 643.27 8.80 0.54 0.53 0.63 0.59
Indonesia 210.47 2.88 185.24 2.53 190.92 2.61 0.86 0.78 0.67 0.58
RSA 172.96 2.36 174.46 2.39 172.70 2.36 0.74 0.74 1.45 1.26
SSA 489.26 6.69 429.97 5.88 444.12 6.07 0.83 0.76 1.72 1.40
Low Income 169.31 2.32 161.49 2.21 158.93 2.17 0.59 0.55 1.37 1.28
Table 2: Main indicators for CH4 inventories: 1997 and 2011. Selected regions. Note:
∗Data
is reported as CO2 equivalents with respect to global warming potential for a 100 year time frame. pc
stands for per capita, VA stands for value added, Mt stands for megatons, shr. for world shares, t for ton,
kg for kilogram. EEU stands for Eastern European Union members joining the Union in 2004 and 2007,
including the upper-middle income countries Bulgaria and Romania; for the group totals these countries
are assigned to their respective income group. RSA stands for the Rest of South Asia area, SSA for the
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa region. For details on the countries covered in these regions see Table B.1 in
Appendix B.
sions derived from production declined by 11% between 1997 and 2011; the decline was
less pronounced for emissions embodied in final production and consumption.
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High-income countries show, on average, the highest level of methane emissions per person,
followed by upper-middle and lower-middle income countries. In high-income countries,
per capita emissions consumed are larger than per capita CH4 embodied in production,
reflecting the fact that they are net importers of emissions. By contrast, for the other
income categories the opposite is true. During 1997–2011, emissions per capita grew
most strongly in upper-middle income countries, whereas they increased only slightly in
the lower-middle and low-income groups and even experienced a decrease in the high-
income countries. Large producers of fossil fuels show rather high per capita emissions
compared to the other countries in their respective income groups and are usually also net
exporters of emissions, as the production-based per capita inventories considerably exceed
the consumption-based ones.
High-income economies show by far the highest methane efficiency per unit of value added,
followed by upper-middle and lower-middle income countries; low-income economies are
particularly methane intensive. Yet, the methane efficiency of high-income countries is
higher for production than for consumption inventories whereas the opposite is the case
in the other income groups. Between 1997 and 2011, improvements in methane efficiency
were especially important in the lower- and upper-middle income countries, which were
able to reduce the methane content of value added by about one third. The high- and
low-income groups showed only slightly lower improvements in the methane content of
value added from production and comparably smaller improvements in the CH4 efficiency
embodied in consumption.
2.2 Decomposition of changes in methane emissions
Figure 2 decomposes the growth rate of total emissions between 1997 and 2011 (marked
by the black dots) from the three emission inventories and for the four income groups into
changes in methane intensity (dark bar), changes in value added per capita (light bar),
and population growth (white bar). In general, the expansion of value added per capita
and population growth have increased emissions, whereas efficiency gains had the opposite
effect. Only in high-income countries, the rather moderate growth rates of population and
value added did not outweigh efficiency improvements and, as a result, total emissions
decreased during 1997–2011. In the other income groups, the expansion of value added per
capita and population surpassed efficiency gains and yielded increasing methane releases.
Figure 3 shows the decomposition of emissions growth at the sectoral level and reveals that
the aggregate pattern shown in Figure 2 hides important sector-specific characteristics.11
11 For the sectoral analysis we aggregate the 57 sectors in our dataset to seven sectors: agriculture,
livestock, energy, manufacturing, services, transport, and public administration. A detailed definition
of these sectors is available in Table B.2 in Appendix B.
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Figure 2: Change in components of the Kaya-identity (1997–2011). Note: The barplots show
the log-differences of the components of the Kaya-identity between 1997 and 2011 for the four World Bank
income groups. The Kaya identity decomposes total CH4 emissions into CH4 per value added, value added
per capita, and population, according to the formula CH4 =
CH4
V A
· V A
pop
· pop. The data is presented for the
three inventories in our dataset: standard production (prod.), final production (f.prod.) and consumption
(cons.). Additionally we show the growth rate of total emissions (in log-differences), marked as black dot.
Although efficiency gains were important on the aggregate level, they were not realized
to the same extent in every economic sector. This points towards different potential
for emission abatement in different sectors. Improvements in efficiency were particularly
limited in the manufacturing and transport sectors, which even experienced an increase in
the CH4 intensity of value added in most income groups. Also the primary sectors have
shown lower mitigation potential as compared to other sectors; the livestock sector in low-
income countries and the agriculture sector in high-income economies were characterized
by a slight decline in methane efficiency. In all income groups the largest efficiency gains
took place in the energy, services, and public administration sectors.
The economy-wide changes in value-added per capita are also to a large extent influenced
by sectoral shifts of production and consumption patterns. The energy and the public
administration sectors (the latter includes landfills and sewage treatment) experienced a
strong growth during 1997–2011 in all income groups. In low-income countries also the
manufacturing sector expanded considerably, whereas for the other income groups the ser-
vice sector was among the sectors that grew more strongly. In high-income countries, the
primary, manufacturing, and transport sectors even decreased their shares in value added.
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These patterns are consistent with the structural shifts usually associated with economic
development (Kuznets, 1973, Herrendorf et al., 2013) and highlight the importance of
analyzing emissions at the sectoral level.
2.3 Methane embodied in international trade
Table 3 describes the flows of methane emissions embodied in international trade. It
reports the CH4 content of exports and imports scaled to production-based emissions,
net-exports of emissions embodied in intermediates and total trade, indicators for emission
leakage, and measures of methane intensity of international trade.
As a result of intensifying globalization, the ratio of traded to total methane emissions
increased from 18.5% to 22.9% between 1997 and 2011, particularly in high-income coun-
tries. The group of high-income countries traded embodied emissions more intensively
than their less developed counterparts. This is largely driven by the CH4 content of im-
ports, since the share of exported methane emissions scaled to total production-based
emissions is relatively low in most regions.12 With the exception of fuel exporters such as
Australia, the CH4 content of imports is rather large in the group of high-income coun-
tries, as exemplified by the EU-15 and the USA, where imported emissions amounted to
92% and 53% of production-based emissions in 2011.
The higher CH4 content of imports relative to exports in high-income countries again con-
firms that they are net-importers of methane. Their trade balance of emissions embodied
in trade in intermediates (BEETI) and in total trade (BEETT), scaled to production-
based emissions, is typically negative. This imbalance grew between 1997 and 2011, with
a growing reliance of high-income countries on net-imports of CH4, mirrored by increased
net-exports in middle- and low-income countries. Also shown by BEETI and BEETT,
traded methane emissions are embodied in traded intermediates and final goods alike.13
The net-importation of methane in high-income countries, many of which are bound by
emission targets specified in the Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol, points towards potential
for methane leakage. Emissions embodied in imports from non-Annex I countries scaled to
emissions from territorial production are the largest in the group of high-income countries,
particularly in the EU-15 and USA, whereas they are below the high-income average
in Australia and EEU. In middle- and low-income countries this indicator is typically
much lower, though during 1997–2011 it doubled in the upper-middle and low-income
groups and increased by a factor of 2.7 in the lower-middle income group, reflecting the
12 Exceptions are large fossil fuel exporters, such as Australia, Russia, and the Middle East.
13 This contrasts with CO2 emissions, which are mainly embodied in trade in intermediates, because of
their origin in energy usage (see Ferna´ndez-Amador et al., 2016).
12
Embodied CH4∗ CH4 leakage∗ CH4 per VA∗
exports imports BEETI BEETT prod. imports exports imports
(shares of prod. emissions) (shares of) (kg/USD)
1997
High Income 18.21 52.43 -25.75 -34.24 32.91 62.76 0.10 0.31
Australia 48.40 9.27 25.92 39.13 5.95 64.20 0.99 0.19
EU 15 8.40 59.41 -39.90 -51.01 35.59 59.90 0.05 0.38
EEU 22.87 22.43 -3.03 0.44 9.56 42.60 0.49 0.35
USA 11.63 36.59 -15.12 -24.96 25.50 69.70 0.09 0.27
Upper Middle 22.13 8.10 10.67 14.04 5.23 64.60 0.72 0.25
Brazil 3.18 7.34 -4.17 -4.16 5.51 75.08 0.18 0.30
Russia 32.04 7.37 25.16 24.67 5.54 75.10 2.10 0.49
China 19.12 3.26 7.99 15.86 1.86 56.93 1.12 0.19
Mexico 12.83 12.28 0.14 0.55 4.07 33.17 0.16 0.16
Middle East 45.92 17.26 30.90 28.66 9.17 53.12 0.68 0.25
Lower Middle 14.60 5.48 6.81 9.12 2.74 49.97 1.06 0.33
Former SU 29.40 10.17 11.29 19.23 0.63 6.15 2.57 0.76
India 4.58 2.42 0.39 2.16 1.87 77.17 0.75 0.33
Indonesia 15.08 8.24 7.94 6.83 4.52 54.81 0.53 0.29
RSA 6.36 3.92 0.54 2.44 3.03 77.14 0.90 0.38
SSA 16.82 2.27 12.78 14.81 1.55 68.26 1.73 0.21
Low Income 8.22 3.75 1.75 4.47 3.03 80.88 1.22 0.37
2011
High Income 23.03 71.36 -40.03 -48.18 46.78 65.56 0.08 0.27
Australia 60.57 14.99 36.97 45.58 11.29 75.33 0.83 0.20
EU 15 11.94 91.59 -69.88 -79.66 57.81 63.12 0.04 0.32
EEU 23.50 35.31 -13.26 -11.81 16.01 45.34 0.23 0.24
USA 13.46 53.48 -27.16 -40.02 39.44 73.75 0.07 0.25
Upper Middle 25.87 13.74 9.59 12.08 9.94 72.37 0.49 0.25
Brazil 12.66 7.73 3.13 4.93 5.74 74.24 0.48 0.23
Russia 40.29 8.05 32.96 32.24 6.03 74.93 1.73 0.27
China 19.49 9.63 1.74 9.86 6.64 68.99 0.49 0.21
Mexico 19.77 20.47 1.19 -0.70 10.25 50.05 0.17 0.17
Middle East 53.06 29.52 34.21 23.54 21.72 73.58 0.44 0.31
Lower Middle 19.15 10.11 8.19 9.04 7.41 73.28 0.76 0.31
Former SU 32.55 9.27 21.59 23.29 4.19 45.23 1.13 0.32
India 11.86 9.53 -1.26 2.33 7.48 78.55 0.51 0.30
Indonesia 22.76 13.47 11.99 9.29 10.05 74.57 0.72 0.34
RSA 6.98 6.83 -0.87 0.15 5.79 84.70 0.90 0.38
SSA 16.60 7.37 12.12 9.23 6.04 82.00 1.09 0.33
Low Income 13.03 6.91 4.62 6.13 6.22 90.04 0.84 0.44
Table 3: CH4 emissions embodied in trade: 1997 and 2011. Selected regions and income
groups. Note: ∗Data are reported as CO2 equivalents with respect to global warming potential for
a 100 year time frame. BEETI and BEETT stand for net balance of emissions embodied in trade in
intermediates and total trade, respectively. EEU stands for Eastern European Union members joining the
Union in 2004 and 2007. The region includes the upper middle income countries Bulgaria and Romania.
For the development group aggregates these countries were assigned to the upper middle income group,
however. RSA stands for the Rest of South Asia area, SSA for the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa region. For
details on the countries covered in these regions please refer to Table B.1 in Appendix B. Income groups
are based on World Bank definitions.
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growing importance of trade among developing countries. The importance of developing
economies in methane embodied in trade flows appears even clearer when we look at
emissions embodied in imports from non-Annex I members as a share of total imported
emissions. This other indicator of methane leakage is rather high in all income groups and
has been growing over the period considered.
In terms of methane intensity, imports of high-income countries are, on average, more
intensive in CH4 content per unit of value added than exports. For the other income
groups the opposite applies, with a notable difference in the low-income group. A com-
parison of these figures to the CH4 intensities reported in Table 2 reveals that exports of
the high- and upper-middle income groups are typically more CH4 intensive than their
national production, whereas the CH4 intensity of imports is higher than the one of con-
sumption in the high-income group. For the lower-middle and low-income groups, trade
flows show larger methane efficiency than production and consumption aggregates; that
is, the aggregate of domestic emissions (produced and consumed in the territory) is less
environmentally efficient than the sectors oriented to trade. Finally, we observe a general
decrease in the CH4 intensity of trade over time, reflecting gains in methane efficiency
that were also visible from Table 2.
3 Empirical specification and econometric methodology
3.1 Explanatory variables and data sources
Anthropogenic methane emissions originate from very different sources, which depend
on diverse socio-economic drivers and, notably, on the relationship between economic
development and emissions. Economic development, proxied by income per capita, has
been found to be positively connected to methane emissions. Various authors have found
evidence for non-linear effects of economic growth on other greenhouse gas emissions; thus,
we allow for non-linearities of different forms in the income-methane relationship.14
Economic development goes often hand in hand with other transformations (Kuznets,
1973), e.g. demographic transitions, urbanization, changing specialization and more
energy-intensive production patterns, capital accumulation and technological innovation,
and stronger preferences for a clean environment. The effects of population growth and
urbanization are a priori ambiguous: A higher population density may imply efficiency
14 For an inverted-U relationship between income and pollution emissions see e.g. Frankel and Rose (2005),
Grossman and Krueger (1993), Kearsley and Riddel (2010), Millimet et al. (2003), Cole (2004), and
Schmalensee et al. (1998). For a piecewise linear relationship see e.g. Aslanidis and Iranzo (2009) and
Ferna´ndez-Amador et al. (2017). Rosa et al. (2004) tested for a polynomial relationship between income
and methane emissions but did not find statistically significant effects of the squared income term.
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gains in the provision of services, transport, and energy supply; yet population growth
increases the demand for goods and services and raises emissions.15 Similarly, urbaniza-
tion may capture structural change associated with development and can affect emissions
if energy consumption is higher in urban areas.
The effect of specialization and trade patterns on a country’s environmental performance
is theoretically unclear. On the one side, trade may favor transfer of cleaner technologies
and contribute to reducing methane emissions (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). On the
other side, environmental regulation can also affect the re-location of industries across
countries; in this case, trade flows would be related to opportunities to avoid strict regu-
lations (methane leakage) and affect negatively the environment by increasing emissions
(Copeland and Taylor, 2004). We test for the impact of trade openness on emissions and
also control for food and fuel (including coal, gas and oil) exports as a share of total ex-
ports.16 We also include the rents from fossil fuel production (including coal, gas and oil)
as a share of GDP, since large producers of fossil fuels might rely more heavily on cheap
but dirty energy derived from it.
Several variables relate to citizens’ preferences for a cleaner environment. The Kyoto
Protocol covers methane and four other GHGs besides CO2. We include a dummy vari-
able equal to one in case of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and Annex I membership.
Other variables are included to capture the effect of institutional development that can
affect pollution patterns. The effect of democracy on emissions is theoretically ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, demand for a cleaner environment is more likely to influence policy
making in more democratic regimes, while, on the other hand, lobbies might campaign
against environmental regulation, affecting adversely the potential for future pollution
mitigation.17 Additionally, we control for different categories of the Human Development
Indicator to capture potential qualitative effects from socio-economic development (see
Ferna´ndez-Amador et al., 2017).
In the econometric analysis we explicitly account for potential endogeneity of economic
growth and Annex I ratification with respect to methane emissions. Economic growth
15 See e.g. Ferna´ndez-Amador et al. (2017), Frankel and Rose (2005), Harbaugh et al. (2002) and Torras
and Boyce (1998) for studies using population density as a determinant of different GHG emissions.
16 For studies that tested the effect of trade openness on other GHG emissions, see e.g. Antweiler et al.
(2001), Cole (2004), Cole and Elliott (2003), Ferna´ndez-Amador et al. (2017), Frankel and Rose (2005),
Harbaugh et al. (2002), and Kearsley and Riddel (2010). Jorgenson and Birkholz (2010) proposed using
food and fuel exports as a share of total exports to capture globalization-induced pressure on producers
of these products to adapt environmental standards.
17 Aichele and Felbermayr (2012, 2015) and Ferna´ndez-Amador et al. (2017) investigated the effect of
the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions. Ferna´ndez-Amador et al. (2017), Frankel and Rose (2005),
and Aichele and Felbermayr (2012), among others, tested the impact of democracy on different GHG
emissions. Furthermore, Barrett and Graddy (2000) found that an increase in freedom improves envi-
ronmental quality.
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will be endogenous if, for example, growth depends on a country’s resource endowments
or if environmental regulation limits a country’s growth potential (e.g. Stern et al., 1996,
Dinda, 2005, Frankel and Rose, 2005). Environmental regulation may be endogenous if
countries decide to adopt it based on climate change vulnerability, endowments of re-
newable energy sources, patterns of comparative advantage, or prospects of decreasing
emissions (e.g. Aichele and Felbermayr, 2012, 2015, Ferna´ndez-Amador et al., 2017). We
instrument current income with three years lagged income and investment growth, and An-
nex I membership with the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC).18
We source data on per capita income corrected for purchasing power, population density,
the share of fossil fuel rents with respect to GDP, and urbanization from the World Devel-
opment Indicators (WDI) database. Trade openness and the shares of food and fossil fuel
exports with respect to total exports are based on data from GTAP. We use a measure
of democracy from the Polity IV database, development categories of the Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI) from the HDI database, and information concerning the ratification
of Annex I and the Rome Statute of the ICC from the UN Treaty Collection Database.
Data on investment are from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.19
3.2 Econometric methodology
We outline the econometric identification of the determinants of CH4 emissions derived
from production, final production, and consumption inventories below. We apply these
models subsequently on economy-wide and sectoral CH4 inventories. Since the failure to
account for potential non-linearities between income and emissions could lead to omitted
variable bias, we pay attention to the relationship between pollution and income per
capita. We first estimate polynomial regressions, including a squared (log) income term
among the regressors. Second, we estimate threshold (piecewise-linear) regression models,
18 For the choice of the instruments see Aichele and Felbermayr (2012, 2015), Ferna´ndez-Amador et al.
(2017), Frankel and Rose (2005). In models including a squared income term, we instrument this
term by using lagged income squared as additional instrument. In the threshold models we instrument
regime-specific effects of income using regime specific terms for lagged income and investment growth as
instruments. We acknowledge that also international trade might by affected by reverse causality if the
implementation of stringent environmental regulation leads to a decrease in emissions and at the same
time induces firms to shift heavily polluting activities to other countries from which the produced goods
are imported. This potential endogeneity has been tackled in cross sectional studies on GHG emissions
using gravity estimators (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 2005, Managi et al., 2009). Yet, in our panel setup
we cannot use the gravity-based trade instrument together with fixed effects, as the gravity framework
makes use of time-invariant explanatory variables which are captured by the fixed effects in the main
equation.
19 A complete description of the data and a summary of data sources is available in Table B.4 in Appendix
B. Summary statistics for the variables used are reported in Table B.5.
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in which the threshold is endogenously estimated (see Hansen, 1999, Caner and Hansen,
2004).20
The polynomial models of the determinants of production- and footprint-based CH4 emis-
sions per capita take the form:
Eit = α+ β1yit + β2y
2
it + γ1ait + γ2tit + Z
′
itδ + νt + uit, (1)
where Eit stands for annual (logged) CH4 emissions per capita of region i in period t,
subsequently from production, final production, and consumption inventories. yit is the
logarithm of annual real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, ait is
a dummy variable for Annex I membership, tit is a measure of trade openness, Zit is a
vector of controls and νt is a vector of time fixed effects. β1, β2, γ1, and γ2 are coefficient
estimates, δ is a coefficient vector, and uit are the disturbances. As control variables, Z,
we include food exports and fuel exports as share of total exports, the natural logarithm
of population density, urbanization, fossil rents as a share of GDP, a democracy index,
and development group dummies.
We estimate equation (1) using pooled OLS, such that uit ∼ N(0, σ2), and FE estimators,
such that uit = µi + eit, where µi are individual fixed effects and eit ∼ N(0, σ2). The
individual fixed effects take into account unobserved heterogeneity between countries and
mitigate omitted variable bias. In alternative specifications we account for the potential
endogeneity of income (and its square) and Annex I ratification following the instrumen-
tation strategy described above. We estimate the instrumental variable regression models
using 2-stage Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM).
If β1 and β2 are both statistically significant and the estimate of the turning point is in
sample, there will be evidence for a polynomial relationship between income and CH4
emissions. Otherwise, linearity cannot be rejected.21
Additionally, we consider the threshold (piece-wise linear) specification
Eit = α+
m∑
k=1
[βkyitI(τk−1 < qit ≤ τk)] + γ1ait + γ2tit + Z ′itδ + νt + uit, (2)
20 We test the threshold model against a model without threshold, following the methodology of Hansen
(1996, 1999). In case we detect evidence for non-linearities based on both the polynomial and the
threshold model, we report the results of the model that minimizes the sum of squared residuals.
21 When linearity cannot be rejected, we only report the results without the squared income term in the
main text of the paper. Results including the squared term are available in Appendix C.
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where all variables and coefficient vectors are defined as before and the perturbations
uit = µi + eit, where eit ∼ N(0, σ2), account for individual-specific fixed effects.22 The
indicator function I(·) determines regimes with different income elasticities, which depend
on whether the threshold variable qit (in our case the logarithm of GDP per capita five
years lagged) is included in the estimated threshold interval (τk−1, τk]; k = 1, . . . ,m,
where m is the number of regimes. The thresholds τk are contained in the domain of qit,
(τk ∈ [qminit , qmaxit ]), where τ0 < qminit and τm = qmaxit . The continuous threshold variable qit
is assumed to be exogenous. The coefficients of the FE model can be estimated by OLS
after double-demeaning cancels time and individual FE, νt and µi.
The thresholds, τ , are treated as unknown and are consistently estimated (see Hansen 1999,
2000). The least squares estimator for the threshold vector τ is defined as minimizing the
concentrated sum of squared errors (conditioned on τ), where minimization is based on
a grid search over the domain of the threshold variable qit. We restrict the searchable
domain to values of qit such that at least 15% of the observations lie in any regime in
order to avoid regimes with too few observations.
Given an additional threshold estimate τˆk, we use a likelihood ratio (LR) test where
the null hypothesis is the non-existence of the additional threshold. Applying this test
sequentially until we reject a new threshold effect, we determine the number of thresholds
in (2). This test is non-standard and thus we use a bootstrap procedure based on Hansen
(1996) to simulate the asymptotic distribution and to construct the p-values (see Hansen,
1999, for details). τˆ is a consistent estimator of τ , but its asymptotic distribution is also
non-standard. Therefore, following Hansen (1996), we define the confidence interval for
τˆ as the non-rejection region of an LR test with the null of no statistically significant
difference between a proposal for τ and τˆ at the 1% significance level.
To allow for potential endogeneity of income and Annex I ratification, we follow Caner and
Hansen (2004) and estimate an IV-FE threshold model using the instruments described
above. The IV-FE threshold estimation procedure follows three steps. First, we regress the
endogenous variables on the exogenous variables and instruments to obtain the predicted
values of the endogenous variables. Second, we regress Eit on these predicted values and
the exogenous controls and estimate the threshold parameter τ by means of a grid search.
We test for the significance of the (new) threshold and compute its confidence interval as
described above. Finally, we estimate the coefficients of the second-stage by 2-stage GMM,
conditioned on the estimate for the threshold τˆ . The algorithm is repeated conditioned
on the threshold estimates until no additional threshold is found.
22 We only consider threshold models containing individual FE, because the results from the linear models
below indicate that there is evidence for omitted variable bias in specifications without FE.
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4 Estimation results
4.1 Economy-wide results
Table 4 presents the results of the linear estimations of economy-wide methane emissions.
We concentrate on the linear models before turning to the threshold estimates, since we do
not find evidence for a polynomial relationship between income and emissions.23 The OLS
specifications for production, final production, and consumption based CH4 inventories are
presented in Panel (1). Panel (2) shows the results for IV models, where we account for the
potential endogeneity of income and Annex I ratification by instrumenting these variables
as explained in section 3. Panel (3) and (4) report the results of the specifications with
country FE and IV-FE.24
The results in panels (1) and (2) provide interesting insights concerning the effect of a
large set of control variables on CH4 emissions by exploiting the cross-country variation
of the data. They suggest that income is positively related to CH4 emissions for all three
inventories, with an elasticity of between 0.25 and 0.33. We do not detect a significant
effect of Annex I ratification. Countries that are more open to trade tend to release more
emissions. Additionally, as in Jorgenson and Birkholz (2010), a higher share of food in
total exports is connected to higher emissions. The share of fuel exports is insignificant,
though. Emissions are significantly lower in more densely populated areas, suggesting
efficiency gains in the production and provision of energy and CH4 intensive goods and
services. By contrast, urbanization is related to more CH4 intensive patterns of final pro-
duction and consumption. It is likely that urbanization picks up some effects of economic
development. Furthermore, large producers of fossil fuels show a higher level of CH4 em-
bodied in production. The political regime index and the development group dummies
are insignificant, pointing to absence of remarkable effects from institutional changes as-
sociated with economic development, after controlling for income per capita. Finally, the
time dummies are relatively unimportant in explaining variations in CH4 production, but
they capture a decreasing trend in CH4 embodied in final production and consumption
over the period 2007–2011.
23 The results of the polynomial models are available in tables C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C. They suggest
statistically insignificant income elasticities or turning points that lie out of sample.
24 The Hansen-J test for the validity of our instruments, which is reported in the bottom of Table 4 points
towards the validity of the instruments used. The Wu-Hausman test rejects the null of exogeneity of
income for the IV regressions. Despite of the theoretical arguments of the endogeneity of Annex I
ratification, the exogeneity of this variable cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. The
results of the first stage regressions are reported in table C.1 in Appendix C.
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Panels (3) and (4) show the results of specifications including individual fixed effects which
correct for potential bias from omitted time-invariant variables.25 The individual-specific
FE are jointly highly statistically significant, whereas many variables turn insignificant as
a consequence of their small time variation.26 The results confirm the positive effect of
income on CH4 emissions, but suggest a somewhat higher income elasticity (0.28-0.39).
27
Annex I ratification is connected to significantly lower emissions in production inventories
but to higher emissions stemming from final production and consumption. This suggests
that even though members of the Annex I have reduced their produced emissions, their
CH4 footprints became larger. Nevertheless, the significant effect of Annex I disappears
when accounting for the potential endogeneity of its ratification.28 Trade openness turns
insignificant like the remaining variables. Only fuel exports and urbanization appear
significant in final production inventories. The production structure of large fossil fuel
producers explains the negative effect of fuel exports. Countries that specialize in fossil
fuel production tend to produce less final products, because fossil fuels are mainly used
as intermediates. Thus, fossil fuel exporters emit less CH4 from final production. By
contrast, urbanization has a positive effect on CH4 embodied in final products. It may be
capturing part of the effect of economic growth on emissions per capita, since it is related
to economic development. Finally, the time effects suggest, ceteris paribus, a decreasing
global trend in all emission inventories during the whole period of analysis.
Although a polynomial relationship between income and CH4 emissions per capita has
been rejected, it is possible to test for other forms of non-linearities. In Table 5 we
allow for threshold effects in the relation between income and emissions.29 The results
provide evidence for the existence of threshold effects in all three inventories. The middle
part of the table reports the value of the threshold estimates, their lower and upper
25 The inclusion of individual FE is equivalent to exploiting the within-country time-variation present in
the data.
26 To optimize efficiency in the estimations, we exclude insignificant regressors. We report only the results
for our baseline set of controls and of variables that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level.
The individual-specific FE are jointly highly statistically significant also if they are included together
with the full set of regressors (see Table C.3 in Appendix C).
27 Urbanization and fuel exports have statistically significant effects on CH4 embodied in final production,
but remain insignificant in production and consumption inventories. For the final production inventory,
urbanization seems to pick up part of the positive effect of income per capita. For CH4 consumption,
urbanization is close to be statistically significant at the 10% level, with a quantitatively similar effect as
for final production. Omitting urbanization and fuel exports from the specifications for final production
inventories results in a slightly larger income-elasticity (0.32 for FE and IV-FE).
28 Based on the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, we cannot reject the exogeneity of Annex I ratification and
GDP per capita in the FE specifications. Yet, since theoretical arguments suggest that these variables
are endogenous, we instrument them. Our IV-FE estimates are thus conservative, in the sense that they
are consistent also if GDP per capita and Annex I are indeed endogenous, though they are inefficient
compared to the uninstrumented FE estimates.
29 The specifications include the same control variables as the FE models from before, together with indi-
vidual and time fixed effects. For consumption inventories we add urbanization to the list of regressors
since it turns out as statistically significant in the threshold specifications.
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Panel (1) FE Panel (2) IV-FE
prod. fin.prod. cons. prod. fin.prod. cons.
ln(Income), reg. 1 0.312 *** 0.235 *** 0.283 *** 0.371 *** 0.238 *** 0.298 **
(0.066) (0.059) (0.082) (0.079) (0.084) (0.119)
ln(Income), reg. 2 0.324 *** 0.245 *** 0.294 *** 0.365 *** 0.227 *** 0.284 **
(0.065) (0.058) (0.081) (0.080) (0.086) (0.121)
ln(Income), reg. 3 0.316 *** 0.236 *** 0.282 ***
(0.065) (0.058) (0.082)
Annex I -0.033 0.080 *** 0.100 *** -0.079 * 0.123 * 0.141 **
(0.023) (0.028) (0.036) (0.044) (0.072) (0.071)
Openness 0.096 ** 0.078 0.029 0.061 * 0.068 0.006
(0.048) (0.073) (0.097) (0.034) (0.069) (0.086)
Fuel exports -0.232 ** -0.197 *
(0.099) (0.115)
Urbanization 1.052 ** 1.118 * 1.144 * 1.131 *
(0.506) (0.580) (0.615) (0.675)
First threshold (value) 9.307 10.411 10.411 10.445 10.411 10.411
99% CI lower bound 9.294 10.370 10.382 10.409 10.369 10.382
99% CI upper bound 9.379 10.469 10.469 10.483 10.448 10.444
Bootstrap p-value 0.016 0.002 0.004 0.038 0.000 0.000
Second threshold (value) 10.411 9.313 9.341
99% CI lower bound 10.175 9.294 9.278
99% CI upper bound 10.470 9.408 9.408
Bootstrap p-value 0.072 0.024 0.070
Wald equal. coeff. reg. 1/2 (p) 0.0333 0.0912 0.0868 0.1069 0.0010 0.0021
Wald equal. coeff. reg. 2/3 (p) 0.0044 0.0009 0.0033
Wald equal. coeff. reg. 1/3 (p) 0.5391 0.8448 0.9498
Hansen-J (p) - - - 0.489 0.605 0.595
Wu-Hausman Inc., reg.1 (p) - - - 0.0564 0.9740 0.9680
Wu-Hausman Inc., reg.2 (p) - - - 0.0994 0.1201 0.4244
Wu-Hausman Ann.I. (p) - - - 0.1200 0.4279 0.4272
SSR no threshold 2.975 3.202 4.402 2.997 3.204 4.403
SSR one threshold 2.830 3.046 4.178 2.946 3.076 4.202
SSR two thresholds 2.745 2.942 4.062 - - -
R2 within 0.232 0.229 0.200 0.176 0.194 0.172
N regime 1 162 164 166 325 317 317
N regime 2 155 153 151 65 73 73
N regime 3 73 73 73 - - -
Table 5: Economy-wide threshold estimates. Note: Cluster robust standard errors (Stock and
Watson, 2008) adjusted for double-demeaning in parentheses. R2 within refers to the R2 within country
and time. The threshold value of 9.307 refers to the (log) GDP per capita of the rest of South African
Customs Union in 2006, 9.313 to Brazil in 1996, 9.341 to Uruguay in 2002, 10.411 to Germany in 1992,
and 10.445 to Hong Kong in 2002.
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bound (corresponding to the 99% confidence interval), and the p-value for testing the null
hypothesis that the threshold does not exist. All thresholds reported in the table are
statistically significant and well defined, as indicated by their rather narrow confidence
intervals. Thus, not accounting for the piecewise-linear relationship between income and
emissions would result in model misspecification and biased estimates.
The findings from the FE models in panel (1) point towards the existence of two thresh-
olds in all emission inventories, while the IV-FE regressions in panel (2) result in one
statistically significant threshold. In panel (1) the positive effect of income on all emis-
sion inventories increases in magnitude when moving from the first (low-) to the second
(middle-income) regime and falls back again to its previous level when moving to the third
(high-income) regime; the thresholds that separate these regimes correspond to log-income
levels of 9.3 and 10.4, respectively. The income-elasticity in the middle-income regime is
about one percentage point higher than in the other two regimes; this difference is sta-
tistically significant (as indicated by the Wald tests in the middle part of the table).30
The IV-FE regressions in panel (2) only capture the higher income threshold, after which
the income elasticity of emissions decreases.31 Compared to the FE results the income
elasticities resulting from IV-FE specifications are higher for production inventories and
rather similar for the final production and consumption inventories.32
Accounting for threshold effects in income per capita uncovers statistically significant ef-
fects of Annex I membership and trade openness, which have been insignificant in the
linear regressions. Annex I membership reduces methane emissions contained in produc-
tion, while it is connected to higher CH4 embodied in final production and consumption.
Moreover, the effects on final production and consumption inventories outweigh the re-
duction of emissions in territorial production inventories, what is consistent with the exis-
tence of methane leakage.33 Our estimates for production inventories are close to those of
Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) for CO2, which indicate a reduction of production-based
CO2 emissions by about 7% as a result of the Kyoto commitment. However, Aichele and
Felbermayr’s results suggest that Annex I ratification tends to increase emissions embod-
ied in imports, which compensates the effect on production inventories, such that there
30 The difference between the first and the second regime is statistically significant at the 5% (production)
or 10% level (final production and consumption), whereas the difference between the second and the
third regime is highly statistically significant at the 1% level for all inventories.
31 The income elasticity of CH4 embodied in final production and consumption decreases by about one
to one-and-a-half percentage points when moving to the high-income regime. For CH4 production the
difference between the two regimes is smaller and statistically insignificant.
32 The Wu-Hausman test, reported in the bottom part of the table, rejects the null of exogeneity of income
for the CH4 production inventory but fails to reject the exogeneity of income for CH4 embodied in final
production and consumption at conventional significance levels.
33 Only in the uninstrumented FE regressions the effect of Annex I membership on CH4 production
inventories is statistically insignificant.
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is no significant effect of Annex I ratification on carbon consumption footprints. This
contrasts with our findings that methane footprints have increased on average in Annex
I member countries. Trade openness has a positive effect on CH4 production inventories,
what, together with the results for Annex I membership, points to the existence of methane
leakage and the inability of the Kyoto Protocol to limit global methane emissions. Finally,
fuel exports and urbanization remain significant drivers of final production inventories,
with the same sign as in linear models. Urbanization turns to significantly increase CH4
emissions embodied in consumption.
Altogether, our results provide evidence for an adverse effect of economic growth on
methane emissions. Yet, there is relative decoupling between economic development and
emissions growth—a one-percent increase in per capita income is connected to a rise of
emissions of less than one percent. The effect of economic growth on emissions is likely to
worsen when moving from lower to middle levels of development, though it improves as
countries reach higher levels of income. While the difference between the regime-dependent
income elasticities is statistically significant, it is of rather low magnitude and only ac-
counts for approximately one percentage point. Furthermore, the effects of trade openness
and the ratification of the Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol are consistent with the existence
of methane leakage. These findings support the view that the Kyoto Protocol did not
introduce mechanisms to change the behavior of the countries bound by emission targets
after signing its Annex I (Barret, 2008), and confirm that the enforcement of compliance
with these targets has been problematic (see Nentjes and Klaassen, 2004, Hagem et al.,
2005, Feaver and Durrant, 2008, Aichele and Felbermayr, 2012).
In order to draw conclusions concerning the mechanisms through which economic growth
affects methane emissions, we have to account for the heterogeneity in the processes that
generate methane as shown in our descriptive analysis. The sectors that are responsible
for emissions at different stages of the supply chain differ in the scope for mitigation, which
is determined by the existence of cleaner alternatives to current (dirty) inputs, the degree
of input substitutability, and the potential to develop new technologies (see Acemoglu
et al., 2012). At a macroeconomic level, sectoral shifts that are associated with economic
development catalyze some of the effects of income on aggregate methane emissions.34
Thus, we carry out our analysis at the sectoral level to derive information on the potential
impact of economic growth and other factors on methane emissions in specific sectors, and
34 Structural (sectoral) transformation is associated with economic development—value-added and labor
shares of agriculture decrease, manufacturing shares show a hump-shaped relationship with economic
growth, and services shares increase. Consumption measures show similar patterns (Herrendorf et al.,
2013).
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to shed light on the environmental effects of long-term shifts in the sectoral composition
of production and consumption patterns.35
4.2 Sectoral results
Tables 6 to 8 present the results of the sectoral IV-FE threshold estimations for the three
emission inventories, and report the contribution of each of the seven sectors to total
emissions.36 Looking first at the sector shares (% of total CH4), methane emissions from
production inventories are primarily concentrated in the livestock, energy, and public
administration (mainly waste management) sectors, which together amount to 80% of
total emissions. In final production and consumption inventories, methane is more evenly
spread across sectors and these three sectors only account for about 50% of total emissions.
The sectoral regressions provide evidence for the existence of non-linearities in the relation-
ship between income and CH4 emissions per capita for most of the 21 sector–inventory
combinations: 15 sector–inventory combinations are characterized by a piecewise-linear
relationship, in one case there is evidence for a polynomial relationship, and in five cases
we fail to find non-linearities.37
The analysis of the functional form of income elasticities at a sectoral level offers an
explanation for the economy-wide non-linear patterns found. The economy-wide results
stem from a mix of linear and threshold models at the sectoral level. The livestock sector,
as well as the transport sector for production inventories, seem to govern the threshold
found for national emissions at a log-income level of 10.4—once this threshold is exceeded,
relative decoupling between emissions and income per capita increases in these sectors.38
The energy, manufacturing, and public administration (mainly waste management) sectors
mainly determine the threshold effect found economy-wide at a log-income level of 9.3;
35 The time dimension of our global emissions dataset is restricted to the 1997–2011 period, which leaves
relatively little time variation to exploit in the FE estimates. As a result, our estimates might not
capture the implications of structural change on emissions to full extent. The inclusion of sectoral value
added shares in our FE regressions mainly results in insignificant coefficients due to the rather low
variability over the time period observed.
36 Like before, we only include the baseline controls and statistically significant regressors in the models.
More specifically, we include all regressors that are statistically significant in the linear IV-FE speci-
fications (see Tables C.4 to C.6 in Appendix C). To determine statistically significant regressors, we
follow a general-to-specific approach—we start with a model including the full set of regressors and
consecutively drop statistically insignificant regressors. See also Tables C.7 to C.13 in Appendix C for
further details.
37 We find a linear relationship between income and CH4 emissions in agriculture for final production,
and in the service and transport sectors for final production and consumption inventories. An inverse-U
relationship is present in the transport sector for territorial production inventories. All other sectors
are best characterized through a piecewise-linear relationship between income and emissions per capita.
38 For public administration we find a statistically significant threshold at a log-income level of about
10.4 after which the income elasticity of emissions is lower for final production inventories. Yet, the
difference between the income elasticities of the two regimes is not statistically significant.
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Dependent variable: CH4 embodied in production (IV-FE specifications) in:
agr. liv. egy. mfc. ser. trn. pub.
(% of total CH4) 9.38% 34.76% 25.12% 3.89% 0.85% 6.13% 19.88%
ln(Income), reg. 1 0.213 0.025 0.690 ** 0.453 ** -0.912 14.984** 0.355 **
(0.222) (0.141) (0.299) (0.195) (0.615) (7.576) (0.166)
ln(Income), reg. 2 0.257 0.011 0.733 ** 0.515 *** -0.817 0.375 **
(0.213) (0.147) (0.298) (0.185) (0.610) (0.165)
ln(Income), squared -0.773*
(0.427)
Annex I 0.085 0.106 -0.356 ** 0.124 0.699 ** -0.527 -0.211 ***
(0.148) (0.212) (0.142) (0.143) (0.317) (0.489) (0.071)
Openness 0.242 *** 0.286 0.338 ** 0.173 * -0.405 0.297 0.031
(0.080) (0.274) (0.149) (0.102) (0.344) (0.311) (0.050)
Food exports 1.144 *
(0.611)
Fossil rents -1.739 *
(1.008)
Polity IV -0.019 **
(0.009)
HDI medium 1.040 **
(0.470)
HDI high 1.513 **
(0.594)
HDI very high 1.671 **
(0.649)
Threshold (value) 8.887 10.382 8.787 8.398 8.635 - 9.338
99% CI lower bound 8.545 8.051 8.762 8.281 8.051 - 9.294
99% CI upper bound 8.918 10.483 8.850 8.528 10.483 - 9.436
Bootstrap p-value 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.020 - 0.004
Wald eqal. coeff.
reg 1/2 (p) 0.1096 0.1378 0.0000 0.0225 0.0310 - 0.0000
Turning point - - - - - 9.695 -
U-test (p) - - - - - 0.119 -
Hansen-J (p) 0.572 0.144 0.206 0.554 0.838 0.334 0.528
Wu-Hausman
Inc., reg.1 (p)a 0.1070 0.4811 0.8806 0.2006 0.5525 0.9685 0.6435
Inc., reg.2 (p)a 0.7944 0.8104 0.2052 0.4435 0.0207 0.9265 0.5846
Ann.I. (p) 0.8698 0.8642 0.0704 0.1703 0.1456 0.2082 0.0180
SSE no threshold 41.098 73.430 33.871 39.002 242.741 183.603 6.040
SSE one threshold 39.833 71.662 32.247 38.308 239.699 - 5.798
R2 withinb 0.034 0.036 0.122 0.114 0.029 0.214 0.117
N regime 1 115 310 108 79 92 390 165
N regime 2 275 80 282 311 298 - 225
Table 6: Sectoral threshold results for CH4 embodied in production. Note: IV-FE results
(specifications include only statistically significant and baseline regressors). agr. stands for agriculture,
liv. for livestock, egy. for energy, mfc. for manufacturing, ser. for services, trn. for transport, and pub.
for public administration (see Table B.2 in the Appendix). The U-Test refers to the test for a U-shaped
relationship by Lind and Mehlum (2010). a The Wu-Hausman test for Inc., reg.1 and reg.2 refer to the
income and squared income term, respectively, for the polynomial model. b R2 within stands for R2 within
country and time for the threshold models and for the R2 within country for the polynomial model. The
threshold value of 8.887 refers to the (log) GDP per capita of the rest of Andean Pact in 2006, 10.382 to
Hong Kong in 1996, 8.787 to the rest of South America in 1996, 8.398 to Morocco in 1999, 8.635 to Sri
Lanka in 2002, and 9.338 to Slovakia in 1992.
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Dependent variable: CH4 embodied in final prod. (IV-FE specifications) in:
agr. liv. egy. mfc. ser. trn. pub.
(% of total CH4) 13.23% 23.83% 4.97% 15.36% 14.19% 4.65% 23.77%
ln(Income), reg. 1 0.342 -0.038 0.041 0.587 ** 0.115 1.109*** 0.395 ***
(0.251) (0.165) (0.389) (0.255) (0.341) (0.385) (0.097)
ln(Income), reg. 2 -0.058 0.063 0.664 *** 0.390 ***
(0.166) (0.380) (0.224) (0.099)
Annex I 0.589*** -0.100 -0.304 * -0.091 0.267** 0.491** -0.107
(0.164) (0.110) (0.169) (0.124) (0.128) (0.203) (0.079)
Openness -0.280* 0.110 * 0.023 0.294 *** -0.049 0.087 0.130
(0.162) (0.059) (0.212) (0.104) (0.149) (0.197) (0.092)
Food exports 1.164 ***
(0.279)
Fuel exports 0.662 *** -1.310 ** -0.707* -1.902**
(0.241) (0.574) (0.377) (0.780)
HDI medium 0.192 0.224**
(0.121) (0.100)
HDI high 0.318* 0.388***
(0.193) (0.146)
HDI very high 0.255 0.288
(0.243) (0.193)
Threshold (value) - 10.348 9.436 8.052 - - 10.469
99% CI lower bound - 10.247 8.051 8.052 - - 10.355
99% CI upper bound - 10.483 10.483 8.052 - - 10.483
Bootstrap p-value - 0.002 0.036 0.000 - - 0.002
Wald equal. coeff.
reg 1/2 (p) - 0.0013 0.2132 0.1114 - - 0.3993
Hansen-J (p) 0.553 0.483 0.300 0.563 0.280 0.115 0.556
Wu-Hausman
Inc., reg.1 (p) 0.1904 0.1432 0.3381 0.5558 0.4967 0.1635 0.1672
Inc., reg.2 (p) - 0.1172 0.3641 0.0262 - - 0.4751
Ann.I. (p) 0.1756 0.4687 0.3932 0.2925 0.0779 0.1768 0.0708
SSE no threshold 28.289 18.011 39.555 28.482 18.344 48.122 6.204
SSE one threshold - 17.233 38.937 26.592 - - 6.074
R2 withina 0.157 0.098 0.074 0.149 0.282 0.319 0.127
N regime 1 390 298 180 59 390 390 330
N regime 2 - 92 210 331 - - 60
Table 7: Sectoral threshold results for CH4 embodied in final production. Note: IV-FE results
(specifications include only statistically significant and baseline regressors). agr. stands for agriculture,
liv. for livestock, egy. for energy, mfc. for manufacturing, ser. for services, trn. for transport, and pub.
for public administration (see Table B.2 in the Appendix). a R2 within stands for R2 within country and
time for the threshold models and for the R2 within country for the linear models. The threshold value of
10.348 refers to the (log) GDP per capita of Belgium in 1992, 9.436 to Brazil in 2006, 8.052 to the rest of
South Asia in 1996, and 10.469 to Sweden in 1999.
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Dependent variable: CH4 embodied in consumption (IV-FE specifications) in:
agr. liv. egy. mfc. ser. trn. pub.
(% of total CH4) 13.23% 23.83% 4.97% 15.36% 14.19% 4.65% 23.77%
ln(Income), reg. 1 0.431 ** 0.012 0.074 0.602 ** 0.136 1.411*** 0.215 *
(0.182) (0.195) (0.466) (0.265) (0.349) (0.414) (0.115)
ln(Income), reg. 2 0.449 ** -0.013 0.095 0.687 *** 0.244 **
(0.182) (0.198) (0.466) (0.234) (0.111)
Annex I 0.612 *** -0.146 0.025 -0.027 0.285** 0.574*** -0.229 ***
(0.134) (0.145) (0.209) (0.100) (0.123) (0.179) (0.086)
Openness -0.027 0.036 -0.031 0.029 -0.055 -0.048 0.123
(0.110) (0.092) (0.239) (0.148) (0.169) (0.202) (0.096)
Food exports 1.134 ***
(0.304)
Fuel exports 0.571 ** -2.133 ***
(0.277) (0.810)
ln(Pop. density) 1.591 **
(0.731)
Polity IV 0.006 **
(0.003)
HDI medium 0.184 0.394 * 0.265***
(0.124) (0.232) (0.102)
HDI high 0.397 ** 0.623 ** 0.433***
(0.188) (0.300) (0.149)
HDI very high 0.337 0.669 ** 0.375**
(0.219) (0.326) (0.190)
Threshold (value) 10.176 10.348 9.308 8.052 - - 9.461
99% CI lower bound 8.051 10.282 8.051 8.052 - - 9.453
99% CI upper bound 10.483 10.369 10.483 8.052 - - 9.570
Bootstrap p-value 0.008 0.000 0.066 0.000 - - 0.004
Wald equal. coeff.
reg. 1/2 (p) 0.0049 0.0094 0.1425 0.0756 - - 0.0010
Hansen-J (p) 0.576 0.275 0.217 0.433 0.290 0.090 0.517
Wu-Hausman
Inc., reg.1 (p) 0.6448 0.4998 0.4687 0.3268 0.4002 0.2597 0.2413
Inc., reg.2 (p) 0.8319 0.3804 0.2897 0.6712 - - 0.2046
Ann.I. (p) 0.0688 0.4038 0.6007 0.7628 0.0835 0.0939 0.0239
SSE no threshold 22.679 19.908 47.855 20.996 18.430 42.675 9.230
SSE one threshold 21.793 17.892 47.440 19.726 - - 8.904
R2 withina 0.173 0.110 0.165 0.199 0.254 0.306 0.117
N regime 1 274 298 163 59 390 390 184
N regime 2 116 92 227 331 - - 206
Table 8: Sectoral threshold results for CH4 embodied in consumption. Note: IV-FE results
(specifications include only statistically significant and baseline regressors). agr. stands for agriculture,
liv. for livestock, egy. for energy, mfc. for manufacturing, ser. for services, trn. for transport, and pub.
for public administration (see Table B.2 in the Appendix). a R2 within stands for R2 within country and
time for the threshold models and for the R2 within country for the linear models. The threshold value of
10.176 refers to the (log) GDP per capita of Spain in 1996, 10.348 to Belgium in 1992, 9.308 to Brazil in
1999, 8.052 to the rest of South Asia in 1996, and 9.461 to Latvia in 2002.
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in these sectors emissions per capita increase more strongly with economic growth once
the threshold has been reached.39 This pattern of sectoral composition in the threshold
effects is consistent with the declining role of primary sectors and the rising importance
of industrialization, which is accompanied by increased demand for energy, public sector
services, and waste management in the course of economic development (see Kuznets,
1973, Herrendorf et al., 2013).
Examining the sectors in detail, for agriculture, economic growth does not significantly af-
fect methane per capita derived from territorial and final production inventories, probably
because production patterns are related to comparative advantage, which changes rather
slowly over time. By contrast, emissions increase significantly with income per capita in
consumption inventories, where also the income elasticity slightly increases after a thresh-
old is reached. This is likely to be driven by the more intensive use of energy in processed
agricultural goods, the sector with the largest share in total methane from consumption
inventories among agriculture sectors. Like for methane derived from production in the
agriculture sector, economic growth does not contribute significantly to emissions from
the livestock and services sectors in any inventory.
The energy and manufacturing sectors show larger elasticities after a certain level of de-
velopment is reached. Emissions embodied in energy production expand with income per
capita, with rather high income elasticities of about 0.7. This effect is mainly determined
by the role of energy as a key intermediate input in production processes. However, it be-
comes statistically insignificant in final production and consumption inventories. Turning
to manufactures, income growth significantly affects methane per capita in all invento-
ries. The income elasticity is rather high, between 0.5 and 0.7, and increases as we move
downstream through the supply chain.
Emissions embodied in transport increase with income, too. For production inventories,
the income elasticity follows an inverse-U shape, with a turning point corresponding to a
log-income level of 9.7. For final production and consumption inventories, income elastic-
ities are larger than one, pointing to coupling between income and emissions per capita.
Finally, economic development results also in higher emissions from public sector services.
The income-elasticity in this sector is moderate, below 0.4, and increases slightly in the sec-
ond regime.40 Notably, for production inventories, methane emissions are mostly released
by waste management.
39 For CH4 production inventories, also the agriculture and services sectors influence this pattern to some
extent. Still, the increase in the income-elasticity of emissions in the agriculture sector is not statistically
significant, and the threshold in the services sector is not very narrowly defined. The same is true to
some extent for agriculture for final production inventories; also there the confidence interval of the
threshold covers the whole income range.
40 The income elasticity of emissions from final production decreases when moving from the first to the
second regime, at a higher threshold value.
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Our sectoral findings suggest that more than 40% of total methane emissions are not
significantly affected by income per capita.41 Notwithstanding, economic development
will also induce shifts in the sectoral composition of production and consumption patterns.
In early stages of development countries are likely to experience industrialization and an
expansion of the manufacturing sector, while primary sectors contract. Based on our
sectoral results, this would increase the income elasticity of methane emissions per capita,
because the manufacturing sector is characterized by a relatively high income elasticity. In
later stages of economic development countries are likely to experience a relative expansion
of the services sector (tertiarization), what may result in a decrease in the income elasticity
of emissions economy-wide, since relative decoupling is larger in the services sector than
in manufactures. Yet, the demand for energy, and the importance of transport and the
public sector (including waste management) will also increase with economic development,
and, given their large income elasticities relative to services, will tend to raise per capita
methane releases. Thus, although the net effect of changes in the sectoral composition is
a priori ambiguous, our empirical results indicate that structural transformation tends to
be connected to more polluting emission patterns.
The ratification of the Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol significantly affects 5 of the sectors
analyzed. On the (territorial) production side, Annex I membership has been associated
with a reduction of emissions per capita in the energy and public administration sectors,
which together account for 45% of total emissions from production. Nevertheless, it has
increased emissions in the service sector, even though this sector has experienced con-
siderable efficiency gains and even reduced its total methane emissions in high income
countries, which are roughly 90% of Annex I signatories (see Figure 3 in subection 2.2).
Thus, this result seems driven by the tertiarization of these economies. When looking
at final production and consumption inventories, Annex-I ratification has been connected
to higher emissions in the agriculture, services, and transport sectors, pointing towards
the existence of methane leakage. Interestingly, the significant emission-reduction effect
of Annex-I ratification disappears in the energy sector when looking at CH4 embodied in
consumption, likely as a result of energy imports from other non-Annex I countries. This
pattern resembles the findings of Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) regarding the effect of
the Kyoto Protocol on total CO2 emissions.
The role of international trade continues to support the hypothesis of methane leakage
effects on the supply side at the sectoral level, though it is restricted to primary and
secondary (including energy) sectors. Trade openness is mainly connected to larger emis-
41 For production inventories, 45% of emissions is not significantly affected by income per capita (i.e.
emissions from agriculture, livestock, and services), while for final production inventories, this share
is 56% of emissions (i.e. agriculture, livestock, energy, and services). For consumption inventories the
ratio is 43% of emissions (i.e. livestock, energy, and services).
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sions in agriculture, energy and manufacturing for production inventories. Noteworthy,
trade also appears significant in some sectors for final production inventories—it increases
emissions per capita in livestock and manufacturing, whereas it tends to lower emissions
per capita in the agriculture sector. Trade remains insignificant at the sectoral level in
consumption inventories.
The share of food products in total exports is not significantly related to changes in
emissions from the primary sectors. This challenges Jorgenson and Birkholz’s (2010) con-
clusions that an economy-wide effect of increasing emissions per capita may be explained
by competitive pressures on food exporters to lower their environmental standards for food
production, or that countries with some orientation to food exports specialize in relatively
more CH4 intensive agricultural products. The share of food in total exports increases
methane per capita embodied in production of manufactures and in final production and
consumption of public sector services. Noteworthy, fuel exports decrease emissions em-
bodied in the final production of energy, services and transport, what seems to result from
the lower specialization of fuel exporters in final products. In addition, fuel exporters
in our sample are characterized by a larger demand for consumption products from the
livestock sector, while their consumption share of energy is smaller, probably affected by
their degree of development. Related to this, higher fossil rents as a share of GDP are con-
nected to lower emissions embodied in manufacturing (production inventories), reflecting
the sectoral composition of countries specialized in fossil energy production.
Interestingly, population density is only significant in one sector. Specifically, higher pop-
ulation density resulting from population growth increases the demand for energy and,
thus, methane embodied in energy consumption. Moreover, urbanization is not significant
anymore in any sector. This indicates that population density and urbanization capture
effects associated with economic growth in economy-wide regressions. These effects are
not found at a sectoral level, where they seem to be better captured by other variables
that proxy socio-economic development (e.g., income per capita and HDI dummies).
Democratic institutions only appear significant in two sectors and inventories. More demo-
cratic institutions are associated with lower levels of emissions per capita in manufactures
in production inventories. This partially counteracts the effect of the Kyoto Protocol
dummy in more advanced democracies. By contrast, democratic institutions tend to
increase emissions per capita in public sector services in consumption inventories, as a
consequence of the larger demand for government services in more democratic political
systems. Finally, higher stages of socio-economic development, as indicated by the HDI-
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group dummies, tend to increase methane releases in various sectors.42 All these effects
question the idea that preferences for cleaner environment may lower methane emissions
in democratic and more developed countries.
5 Conclusions
We put forward a global panel dataset of national inventories of methane emissions em-
bodied in territorial production, final production, and consumption activities. Our dataset
reveals several stylized facts of anthropogenic methane emissions. Global methane emis-
sions are quantitatively important. They are equivalent to between 25% and 84% of CO2
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, depending on the time frame used to compute the
equivalence, and have increased about 25% during 1997–2011. The bulk of emissions is at-
tributable to developing countries, but still high-income countries have been net-importers
of emissions. Economic growth and expanding population have been responsible for the
increase in emissions from developing countries, whereas methane efficiency gains only
partially counteracted these effects.
International, coordinated action on climate change mainly concerns the determination of
property rights on responsibilities for damage, and costs and rents from policies. There
are transaction costs that increase the costs or decrease the probability of reaching an
agreement for multilateral cooperation (Libecap, 2014). Atmospheric methane emissions
are an important global pollutant which shows negative (global) externalities and poses
several challenges to coordinated action to mitigate or abate it. Effective international
cooperation to mitigate global negative externalities, such as methane emissions, will take
place when transaction costs are overcome. In this sense, the information contained in
our dataset contributes to reduce transaction costs associated with scientific uncertainty
regarding the causes of global methane pollution at a regional level and transaction costs
associated with enforcement of policies. Therefore, it can be valuable for the design
and enforcement of policy instruments, and for evaluation of potential inter-sectoral and
international spillovers of the environmental policies applied.
Our econometric analysis confirms a positive relationship between economic growth and
methane emissions for all three emission inventories. This relationship is highly statis-
tically significant and quantitatively important, and points to the existence of relative
decoupling—meaning that a one-percent increase in per capita income leads to a rise
of emissions of less than one percent, though overall emissions still rise with income.
42 HDI dummies pick up effects of economic development that cannot be attributed to the income per
capita. We test for this by deleting HDI groups from the estimations. As a result, income elasticities
increase or become significant (when they were not). Further details are available upon request.
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Economy-wide, the relationship is non-linear, characterized by threshold effects. While
the effect of economic growth on emissions is likely to worsen when moving from lower to
middle levels of development, there is clear evidence for a threshold characterizing small
efficiency gains at very high levels of development.
Although there is substantial heterogeneity in the functional form of the estimated income-
elasticity at a sectoral level, most sectors show threshold effects. The mix of linear and
threshold models found at the sectoral level offers an explanation to the non-linear pat-
terns detected economy-wide. The energy, manufacturing, and public administration sec-
tors mainly determine the rise in the income elasticity of CH4 emissions when moving
from lower-middle to upper-middle levels of income per capita in many sectors, while the
livestock sector, as well as the transport sector for production inventories, govern the small
efficiency gains captured by the threshold effect found at very high levels of development.
Our sectoral findings also show that more than 40% of total methane emissions are not
significantly affected by income per capita. Economic development will also induce sec-
toral composition shifts in production and consumption patterns. Despite the net effect of
sectoral transformation being a priori ambiguous, our results suggest that sectoral shifts
accompanying development may increase emissions.
Preferences for cleaner environment do not seem to lower methane emissions in democratic
and more developed countries. Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol has been largely ineffective
in the mitigation of anthropogenic CH4 emissions. While there is some evidence for a
decrease in emissions derived from production activities in Annex I countries, mainly
resulting from the reduction of emissions in the energy and public administration sectors,
methane releases embodied in final consumption in these countries are significantly larger
than in their non-Annex I counterparts. These results render support to the view that
the targets and enforcement mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol were ill-designed (see,
Nentjes and Klaassen, 2004, Hagem et al., 2005, Barret, 2008, Feaver and Durrant, 2008).
Additionally, international trade has a positive effect on emissions on the production side,
mostly restricted to primary and secondary sectors including energy. The existence of
methane leakage cannot be rejected.
The sectoral heterogeneity found may introduce additional transaction costs associated
with design and implementation of both international agreements and national policies,
which find their ground in the existing asymmetries in economic structures and preferences
across and within nations (Libecap, 2014). The larger the heterogeneity in economic struc-
tures or preferences, the lower the probability of international cooperation to cope with the
problem of global negative externalities. Asymmetries across nations deepen as a result
of increasing divergence in the sectoral composition of their economies at different stages
of economic development or as a consequence of economic specialization. Within nations,
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as methane releases are concentrated in few sectors, sectoral specificities of pollution push
asymmetric preferences concerning mitigation. This influences the positions negotiators
will exhibit in international agreements and affects the willingness to implement national
policies, especially if the sectors affected by the new policies are able to form lobbies.
The rapid increase that methane emissions have recently experienced, together with their
high warming potential, highlight the necessity to start a strong policy strategy to miti-
gate and abate atmospheric concentrations of methane. The carbon-based climate change
paradigm has been connected to the responsibility for CO2 concentrations which have
been reached after decades or centuries of emissions. Given the strong warming potential
of methane in the beginning of its atmospheric life, increasing methane emissions may
change this paradigm, making global warming more dependent on current rather than
past patterns of pollution. This calls for efficient mechanisms to attribute the responsi-
bility for emissions to all economies, regardless of whether they are responsible for past
levels of methane concentrations.
Notwithstanding, as our research underlines, there are some factors that may compli-
cate the design and implementation of environmental instruments against pollution from
methane emissions. There is a remarkable diversity in the anthropogenic processes that
produce CH4 emissions, and many sectors reveal considerable relative decoupling with
respect to economic development. For climate change mitigation to be effective, national
instruments must take into account the diverse nature of the processes that are respon-
sible for emissions and the existence of international trade linkages. National environ-
mental policies must take those sectoral specificities into consideration and take place at
the sectoral level with specific designs. More comprehensive, global agreements on policy
instruments to combat global warming must also address these difficulties and sectoral
particularities.
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Online Appendices
A Construction of national emission inventories
We first generate our national (standard, territorial) production-based emission invento-
ries. For that purpose, we map methane emissions from several sources to the 57 sectors
of the 78 regions covered.43 These inventories constitute the standard measure of national
CH4 emissions relevant for multilateral agreements on emissions reduction such as the
Kyoto Protocol. We then develop inventories of CH4 emissions embodied in both final
production and final consumption activities using MRIO techniques.
A.1 Construction of territorial production inventories
In order to create a consistent panel of sectoral methane emissions inventories for the years
1997, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011, we modify and extend the methodology developed by
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) to elaborate the methane data provided by
the different “non-CO2 Emissions database” releases (see Rose and Lee, 2008, Rose et al.,
2010, Ahmed et al., 2014, Irfanoglu and van der Mensbrugghe, 2015).44 Unfortunately,
the GTAP CH4 emissions data cannot be used in a panel framework, since the sources of
raw data and/or the methodology for data construction differ across releases.45
Therefore, we construct our territorial production inventories, maintaining the sectoral
disaggregation and countries present in GTAP data, ensuring consistency over time. For
the years 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011, we match methane emissions categories from the
FAOSTAT (2014) and EDGAR (2011) databases directly to the 57 sectors where possible,
43 An overview of the regions and sectors covered is available in Table B.1 and B.2, respectively, in
Appendix B. We maintained the highest degree of sectoral and regional disaggregation in order to
minimize aggregation bias, while keeping consistency over time. Therefore, we were able to compute
inventories at 57 sectors, which is equal to GTAP sectoral disaggregation, and 78 regions (66 countries
and 12 regions) which is the minimum regional disaggregation of the raw data used (of GTAP release
for 1997).
44 These releases include methane emissions, among other GHGs, for the years 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011,
disaggregated to 57 economic sectors. We extend the time dimension backwards to 1997.
45 The 2001 release was constructed in cooperation between GTAP and the US Environmental Protection
Agency, resulting in a highly disaggregated database of GHG emissions linked to economic activity
(see Rose et al., 2007, Rose and Lee, 2008); this undertaking has not been repeated since then. Thus,
GTAP applied growth rates of detailed GHG emission categories provided by the EDGAR (2011, non-
agricultural activities) and FAOSTAT (2014, agricultural activities) datasets on their 2001 data to
extrapolate it to 2004 and 2007 (Ahmed et al., 2014). The only exceptions were the GTAP sectors
“mineral production”, “manufactures n.e.c”. and “paper products and publishing”. For these sectors
no EDGAR data was available. Ahmed et al. (2014) thus extrapolate 2001 GTAP data of these sectors
using an output growth approach. For the 2011 release GTAP changed methodology again and matched
EDGAR (2011) and FAOSTAT (2014) data directly to sectors.
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using the concordance tables provided by Irfanoglu and van der Mensbrugghe (2015).46
All categories in the FAO and many in the EDGAR databases can be directly matched to
a single sector, resulting in a direct match of about 75% of global emissions. We allocate
the remaining 25%, which are EDGAR (2011) emission categories that can be matched
to more than one sector, to our 57 sectors by using sector shares of emissions provided
by GTAP. To be as precise as possible, we additionally incorporate GTAP information
on whether emissions are caused by usage of endowments by industries, output and input
usage of industries, or input usage of households, to the mapping process.47 Finally, as the
most recent methane emissions data provided by EDGAR is from 2010, we follow Irfanoglu
and van der Mensbrugghe (2015) and extrapolate EDGAR data to 2011 by using average
growth rates of CH4 in the EDGAR categories between 2007 and 2010.
Additionally, we extend our dataset back to 1997. As for the other years we match FAO
and EDGAR CH4 emissions data directly to sectors where possible; for the remaining
sectors we apply moving averages on the GTAP data from 2001–2011 to derive estimates
for 1997. We then allocate the EDGAR emission categories among sectors using those
shares.
This procedure results in a dataset of territorial CH4 emissions for the years 1997, 2001,
2004, 2007 and 2011 disaggregated to 57 economic sectors. This inventory refers to emis-
sions originated within national boundaries. We can further aggregate sectoral emissions,
resulting in a balanced panel dataset of 390 observations, which correspond to national
production (territorial based) CH4 inventories.
48 In a next step we combine territorial
sectoral emissions data with input-output and trade data provided by GTAP to calculate
comparable final production and consumption based CH4 inventories (i.e. CH4 footprints).
46 As noted by Kirschke et al. (2013), depending on the methodology used to measure atmospheric methane
emissions, anthropogenic emissions dominate natural emissions (top-down methods) or are of a com-
parable size, though slightly below them (bottom-up estimates). Nevertheless, there is uncertainty
associated to these measurements; for example, Schwietzke et al. (2016) report that the estimated con-
tribution of total fuel methane emissions (defined as fossil fuel industry plus natural geological seepage)
has been estimated between 15 and 22% of total methane emissions. However, the authors provided
evidence based on a new isotope records database that (i) total fuel methane emissions may be 60 to
110% larger than current estimates; (ii) emissions from the fossil fuel industry may be 20 to 60% larger
than in current inventories; and (iii) natural gas production emissions may have declined from 8 to 2%
during 1985–2013.
47 See Table B.3 for an overview of the sectors and the matching of FAO and EDGAR data. Unlike GTAP,
we also match the sub-categories of FAO category “Burning Crop Residues” directly to single sectors.
We split methane emissions captured by the EDGAR category “Other Industrial Non-Agricultural
Sources CH4” into “Other - Chemicals ”, assigned to GTAP sector “chemical, rubber and plastic
products (crp)”, and “Other - Metals” assigned to GTAP sectors “ferrous metals (i s)”, “metals n.e.c
(nfm)”.
48 We aggregate our data to the 66 countries and 12 regions present in the year 1997 to remain consistent
over time.
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A.2 From territorial production inventories to final production and con-
sumption inventories
To construct the footprint measures for national CH4 emissions, we implement MRIO
techniques. We first combine input-output and trade data sourced from GTAP to construct
a global intermediate input requirements matrix. Next, we create an environmentally
extended MRIO table by scaling the global requirements matrix to CH4 emissions and
calculate the environmentally extended Leontief-inverse matrix, which collects the direct
and indirect CH4 requirements for a given unit of output for each sector in each region.
We finally derive the final production and consumption based national inventories.
Let us define the vector of sectoral gross outputs in region i as xi = (xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,s)
′,
where its dimension s is the number of sectors defined in the economy (57 in our case). We
define the exporter region as r and the importer region as p, such that r, p ⊆ [1, n], where
n stands for the total number of regions considered (78 in our case). The gross output of a
sector is used as intermediate input for another sector or as final demand. The companion
vector of sectoral gross output for all the n regions is equal to the intermediates required
as inputs from all sectors in all regions plus final demands from all regions. That is,

x1
x2
x3
...
xn

=

A11 A12 A13 · · · A1n
A21 A22 A23 · · · A2n
A31 A32 A33 · · · A3n
...
...
...
. . .
...
An1 An2 An3 · · · Ann


x1
x2
x3
...
xn

+

y11 y21 · · · yn1
y12 y22 · · · yn2
y13 y23 · · · yn3
...
...
. . .
...
y1n y2n · · · ynn

l , (3)
where (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn)
′ is the companion vector of sectoral gross output for all the n
regions. Each Arp is the s × s matrix of trade in intermediates from region r to region
p (which refers to domestic flows wherever r = p). We follow input–output conventions
and define flows across rows as sales and flows down the columns as expenditures. The
components of the Arp matrices are normalized to sectoral gross output. Thus, each
element akj in Arp denotes the direct inputs from sector k in region r needed for a sector
j in region p to produce one unit of output, where k, j ⊆ [1, s]. We calculate the MRIO
tables for each year from input–output, trade, and demand data provided by the GTAP
database following Peters et al. (2011).49 The matrix with elements Arp, which we cast
49 Kanemoto et al. (2012) discuss several methods to compute methane emissions embodied in trade. A
broader discussion of MRIO methodologies can be found in Davis and Caldeira (2010), Davis et al.
(2011), and Peters (2008), among others.
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A, is the MRIO matrix that collects all the intermediate input requirements of all sectors
in all regions. It is of dimension (n · s)× (n · s).
Each element ypr in the last matrix (which we name Y ) appearing on the right-hand side
of equation (3) denotes the final demand in region p for products from region r, being
ypr = (ypr,1, ypr,2, . . . , ypr,s)
′ a column vector of dimension s where each element ypr,z is
the final demand in region p for products from sector z in region r. The vector l is an
all-ones column vector of dimension n. The product of the matrix of final demands by the
vector l, Y l, results in the column vector of total final demands y.
To take into account the indirect flows of CH4 emissions through global supply chains,
we first solve the expression above x = Ax+ y for the companion vector of gross outputs
such that x = (I − A)−1y. The matrix (I − A)−1 is the Leontief-inverse matrix, where I
is the identity matrix. The Leontief-inverse in the multi-regional framework is the matrix
of total (direct and indirect) unit input requirements of each sector in each region for
intermediates from each sector in each region. The columns of the Leontief-inverse matrix
show the unit input requirements (direct and indirect) from all other producers (rows),
generated by one unit of output. Denoting its sub-matrices as (I − A)−1rp , each element
(i − a)−1kj in (I − A)−1rp contains the direct and indirect inputs needed from sector k in
country r to produce one unit of output in sector j in country p.
Finally, we compute the final (embodied) production and final consumption emissions
inventories at a national level. We can define the flux of CH4 emissions embodied in
final production of region r, for = (f
o
r1, f
o
r2, . . . , f
o
rn), where the components of f
o
r (i.e.,
for1, . . . , f
o
rn) show the final production of the region r using intermediates from regions 1
to n embodied in final production of region r. We also define the flux of CH4 emissions
embodied in final consumption of region r, f cr = (f
c
1r, f
c
2r, . . . , f
c
nr), where the components
of f cr (i.e., f
c
1r, . . . , f
c
nr) show the final consumption of the region r of intermediates from
regions 1 to n embodied in final demand of region r. Therefore,
for = E (I −A)−1 or , (4)
f cr = E (I −A)−1 cr , (5)
In expressions (4) and (5), the Leontief-inverse matrix is rescaled by the diagonal matrix E
of dimension (n ·s)×(n ·s) of regional emission-intensities. For that purpose, we define the
vector of sectoral emission-intensities in region i as ei = (ei,1, ei,2, . . . , ei,s) such that each
element is calculated as the ratio of CH4 emissions per gross output of the corresponding
sector (xi,s). The vector of elements of the main diagonal of E, e = (e1, e2, . . . , en), stacks
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all the n regional emission-intensities ei. Thus, the term E (I −A)−1 is the matrix of
total (direct and indirect) embodied methane intensities of each sector in each region; it
is of dimension (n · s) × (n · s). The vectors or and cr are the column-vectors of final
production from region r, o′r = (y′r1, y′r2, y′r3, . . . , y′rn), and final consumption of region
r, c′r = (y′1r, y′2r, y′3r, . . . , y′nr). Both have dimension (n · s).50
Expression (4) describes the flux of emissions embodied in final production of region r.
Methane emissions are a function of the bundle of intermediates from all sectors and
regions that are used in the supply chain, determined by the Leonfief inverse, (I − A)−1,
and the methane intensities, collected in E. As mentioned above, the components of
for (i.e., f
o
r1, . . . , f
o
rn) show the final production of the region r using intermediates from
regions 1 to n embodied in final production of region r. Furthermore, the sum of the
components of for across providers of intermediates, φ
o
r =
∑
p f
o
rp, shows the total (direct
and indirect) CH4 emissions embodied in final production of region r. We can finally
define a vector of components φor, where r ⊆ [1, n], which constitutes our national final
(embodied) production emissions inventories.
Analogously, equation (5) describes the flux of emissions embodied in final consumption
of region r. Methane emissions are a function of the bundle of final goods (incorporating
intermediates) from all sectors and regions that are embodied in final demand of region r,
determined by the Leontief-inverse, (I−A)−1, and the methane intensities, collected in E.
As mentioned above, the components of f cr (i.e., f
c
1r, . . . , f
c
nr) show the final consumption
of the region r of intermediates from regions 1 to n embodied in final demand of region r.
Furthermore, the sum of the elements of f cr across providers of final goods, φ
c
r =
∑
p f
o
pr,
shows the total (direct and indirect) CH4 emissions embodied in final consumption of
region r. We can also define a vector of components φcr, where r ⊆ [1, n], which constitutes
our national consumption emissions inventories.
50 Note that yrp in or denotes exports of final production from region r to region p, while ypr in cr denotes
imports of final demand by region r of production from region p; yrr denotes domestic final demand.
As mentioned above, both yrp and ypr are row vectors of dimension s.
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B Data appendix
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Aggregate Countries and regions included
Single Countries and Regions:
The 66 single countries Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh,
and regions Bulgaria, Brazil, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe
The 12 Composite Regions:
Rest of Andean Pact Bolivia and Equador
Central America, Anguila, Antigua & Barbados, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados
Caribbean Belize, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and Virgin Islands (GB)
Rest of EFTA Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
Rest of Former Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Soviet Union Kyrgyszstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan
Middle East Bahrain, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syrian Arab Rep., United Arab Emirates and Yemen
Rest of North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Tunisia
Other Southern Africa Angola and Mauritius
Rest of South African Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland
Customs Union
Rest of South America Guyana, Paraguay and Suriname
Rest of South Asia (RSA) Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan
Rest of Sub-Saharan Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Africa (SSA) Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo,
Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Liberia, Magagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mayotte,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Togo and Congo (DPR)
Rest of World Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Bermuda, Bosnia and
Herzegowina, Brunei, Cambodia, Faroe Islands, Fiji, French
Polynesia, Gibraltar, Greenland, Guadeloupe, Kiribati,
Lao (PDR), Macau, Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of),
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Myanmar,
Nauru, New Caledonia, Korea (DPR), Papua New Guinea,
San Marino, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu,
Western Samoa, Rest of former Yugoslavia
Table B.1: Countries and GTAP composite regions in the database. Note: Computations were
performed using the regional aggregation of GTAP 5. Countries which show up in later GTAP databases
but not in GTAP 5 were assigned to the Rest of World composite region. Those countries are too small to
change results, however. They are mainly small islands states or territories belonging to the jurisdiction of
another country, which show up in one of the later composite regions (Wallis and Fortuna, for example).
The only notable exceptions are Timor-Leste and Greenland.
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Category IPCC GTAP 1997 2001 2004 2007 2011a
FAO CH4 categories matched directly to a single GTAP sector:
Rice Cultivation n.a. pdr 8.25 8.06 7.51 7.28 7.10
Burning Crops Residues n.a. 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28
of which:
Maize gro 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Paddy Rice pdr 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
Sugar Cane c b 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Wheat wht 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Burning Savanna n.a. ctl 1.63 2.03 1.69 1.57 1.67
Enteric Fermentation n.a. 31.36 30.78 30.10 29.50 27.85
of which:
Cattle, dairy rmk 5.93 5.70 5.53 5.39 5.24
Cattle, non-dairyb ctl 25.08 24.73 24.24 23.78 22.29
Swines oap 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.32
Manure Management n.a. 3.15 3.07 2.95 2.89 2.74
of which:
Cattle, dairy rmk 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.63 0.59
Cattle, non-dairyb ctl 1.08 1.04 1.00 0.98 0.92
Poultry/Swinesc oap 1.33 1.33 1.29 1.27 1.22
EDGAR CH4 categories matched directly to a single GTAP sector:
Coal Mining 1B1 coa 11.65 11.73 13.83 15.35 17.23
Other - Chemicals 2B crp 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
Landfilling 6A osg 9.57 9.23 9.01 8.89 8.53
Wastewater Treatment 6B osg 9.39 9.90 9.77 9.50 9.22
EDGAR CH4 categories matched to more than one GTAP sector:
Combustiond 1A1 - 1A4 4.90 4.45 4.22 4.09 4.22
of which:
Energy Industries 1A1 coa, oil, gas, p c, ely, gdt 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
Industrial Sectors 1A2 omn, cmt, omt, vol, mil, pcr, 0.14 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.34
sgr, ofd, b t, tex, wap,
lea, lum, ppp, crp, nmm,
i s, nfm, fmp, mvh, otn,
ele, ome, omf, cns
Transport Sectors 1A3 otp, wtp, atp 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Agriculture and 1A4 pdr, wht, gro, v f, osd, 4.41 3.99 3.77 3.64 3.77
Services c b, pfb, ocr, ctl, oap,
rmk, wol, frs, fsh, wtr,
trd, cmn, ofi, isr, obs, osg
Oil and Gas Fugitivese 1B2 oil, gas, p c, gdt, otp 19.73 20.37 20.54 20.56 21.09
Other - Metalsf 2C i s, nfm 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Table B.3: CH4 Emissions from FAO and EDGAR categories (percentage of total annual
emissions). Note: a EDGAR data for 2011 is extrapoleted. b Includes Asses, Buffalos, Camels, Goats,
Horses, Llamas, Mules and Sheep. c Includes Chicken, Ducks and Turkeys and Swines. d Stationary and
mobile combustion. e Including exploration, distribution, flaring, leakage at industrial plants, power sta-
tions, commercial and residential sectors, refining, storage, venting and transport. f Including Aluminium,
ferroalloys, iron and steel production as well as other metals.
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N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variables
ln(CH 4 p.c. prod.) 390 0.062 0.677 -1.722 2.010
ln(CH 4 p.c. fin.prod.) 390 0.267 0.602 -1.332 1.674
ln(CH 4 p.c. cons.) 390 0.278 0.594 -1.319 1.675
Control variables
Annex I 390 0.279 0.449 0 1
Food exports 390 0.123 0.129 0.002 0.759
Fossil rents 390 0.042 0.082 0.000 0.476
Fuel exports 390 0.135 0.200 0.000 0.958
HDI middle 390 0.218 0.413 0 1
HDI high 390 0.236 0.425 0 1
HDI very high 390 0.408 0.492 0 1
ln(Income pc) 390 9.502 1.096 6.195 11.479
Openness 390 0.839 0.479 0.176 3.274
Polity IV 390 6.244 5.046 -7 10
ln(Pop. density) 390 -2.606 1.459 -6.030 2.002
Urbanization 390 0.629 0.216 0.118 1
Instruments
ICC ratification 390 0.305 0.461 0 1
ln(Income pc), lag 3 390 9.416 1.111 5.926 11.453
Inv. Growth, lag 3 390 0.108 1.551 -3.814 30.005
Table B.5: Descriptive statistics.
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C Detailed results
C.1 First-stage results of IV estimates
Table C.1 reports the results of the first-stage regressions of the IV and the FE-IV estimates
corresponding to Table 4. The first stage results confirm the relevance of the instruments;
ICC ratification has a positive and highly statistically significant effect on the ratification
of Annex I of the Kyoto protocol, and lagged income and investment growth have a positive
and statistically significant effect on income. Furthermore, the Hansen-J test reported in
Table 4 for each specification gives further evidence on the validity (exogeneity) of the
instruments used.
C.2 Economy-wide results
Table C.2 reports additional results for economy-wide OLS regressions including all re-
gressors and the squared income term. For CH4 production inventories both the OLS and
the IV regressions result in a significantly positive income coefficient and a significantly
negative squared income term, indicating an inverse-U relationship between income and
CH4 production; yet, the implied turning points lie out of sample, indicating that the
inverse-U relationship is an artifact from the estimation and we cannot reject a linear
relationship; thus we skip the squared term from the estimation in the main analysis. For
CH4 embodied in final production both income terms turn out to be statistically insignif-
icant in the polynomial specification. For CH4 consumption inventories the coefficient of
the income term is insignificant, while its square is significantly positive in the OLS and
IV regressions; because of the insignificant level term, we also skip the square from the
estimations in the main analysis.
Table C.3 reports additional results for economy-wide FE regressions including all regres-
sors and the squared income term. When controlling for individual-FE both income terms
turn statistically insignificant throughout. Thus, in the main analysis we omit the squared
income term and all other insignificant covariates from the model specification.
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OLS all inventories FE prod. and cons. FE fin.prod.
Annex I ln(Income) Annex I ln(Income) Annex I ln(Income)
ICC 0.621*** -0.020* 0.586*** -0.029* 0.524*** -0.025
(0.056) (0.011) (0.057) (0.015) (0.065) (0.016)
ln(Income), lag 3 0.004 0.923*** 0.141 0.790*** 0.154 0.789***
(0.030) (0.011) (0.116) (0.041) (0.114) (0.038)
Investment growth, lag 3 -0.000 0.003* 0.007*** 0.003** 0.006*** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Openness 0.043 0.020** 0.006 -0.036 0.003 -0.036
(0.028) (0.008) (0.106) (0.022) (0.111) (0.024)
Food exports -0.160 -0.117***
(0.102) (0.041)
Fuel exports -0.179** -0.014 -0.572*** 0.027
(0.078) (0.028) (0.173) (0.053)
Urbanization -0.051 -0.009 -2.398** 0.158
(0.097) (0.030) (1.014) (0.304)
ln(Pop. density) -0.015 0.000
(0.011) (0.003)
Polity IV 0.005* -0.000
(0.003) (0.001)
Fossil rents 0.312 -0.037
(0.227) (0.089)
HDI middle -0.030 0.107***
(0.045) (0.020)
HDI high 0.027 0.178***
(0.066) (0.024)
HDI very high 0.062 0.209***
(0.101) (0.030)
2001 -0.125*** -0.023** -0.113** 0.005 -0.086* 0.003
(0.045) (0.011) (0.048) (0.011) (0.046) (0.012)
2004 0.151*** 0.002 0.160*** 0.046*** 0.244*** 0.041***
(0.037) (0.013) (0.050) (0.012) (0.059) (0.015)
2007 0.162*** 0.041*** 0.165*** 0.107*** 0.279*** 0.101***
(0.032) (0.012) (0.053) (0.014) (0.066) (0.018)
2011 0.181*** -0.050*** 0.161*** 0.045*** 0.311*** 0.036
(0.035) (0.012) (0.061) (0.016) (0.078) (0.023)
Constant -0.089 0.679***
(0.214) (0.084)
R2 0.700 0.996 0.585 0.882 0.606 0.882
N 390 390 390 390 390 390
Table C.1: First stage results of IV regressions. Note: First-stage estimates of the IV and FE-IV
specifications of Table 4.
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(1) OLS (2) IV
prod. fin.prod. cons. prod. fin.prod. cons.
ln(Income) 0.989** 0.203 -0.284 0.914** 0.139 -0.340
(0.396) (0.308) (0.280) (0.392) (0.297) (0.272)
ln(Income), squared -0.037* 0.007 0.033** -0.036* 0.008 0.034**
(0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014)
Annex I -0.005 0.035 0.059 0.099 0.054 0.076
(0.065) (0.045) (0.040) (0.118) (0.075) (0.066)
Openness 0.136** 0.194*** 0.126*** 0.133** 0.193*** 0.125***
(0.056) (0.041) (0.037) (0.057) (0.042) (0.038)
ln(Pop. density) -0.298*** -0.137*** -0.102*** -0.292*** -0.136*** -0.101***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
Food exports (% of total exports) 1.224*** 0.690*** 0.224 1.234*** 0.674*** 0.219
(0.268) (0.195) (0.153) (0.267) (0.196) (0.154)
Fuel exports (% of total exports) -0.293 -0.075 0.049 -0.251 -0.064 0.067
(0.223) (0.231) (0.198) (0.223) (0.230) (0.198)
Urbanization -0.072 0.669*** 0.770*** 0.028 0.710*** 0.789***
(0.217) (0.165) (0.154) (0.227) (0.170) (0.155)
Polity IV 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.011* 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Fossil rents 1.345** -0.459 -0.668 1.368** -0.472 -0.677
(0.567) (0.551) (0.486) (0.555) (0.551) (0.486)
HDI middle 0.029 -0.040 -0.029 0.087 0.000 0.001
(0.134) (0.110) (0.102) (0.133) (0.109) (0.101)
HDI high 0.070 -0.037 0.000 0.132 0.020 0.041
(0.161) (0.135) (0.124) (0.159) (0.133) (0.123)
HDI very high -0.016 -0.008 -0.001 0.056 0.067 0.052
(0.187) (0.159) (0.144) (0.188) (0.159) (0.144)
2001 -0.030 -0.017 -0.019 -0.024 -0.017 -0.019
(0.069) (0.054) (0.050) (0.069) (0.054) (0.050)
2004 -0.049 -0.029 -0.040 -0.083 -0.035 -0.045
(0.071) (0.056) (0.050) (0.081) (0.061) (0.055)
2007 -0.067 -0.081 -0.097* -0.100 -0.088 -0.102*
(0.072) (0.056) (0.049) (0.077) (0.061) (0.055)
2011 -0.079 -0.115* -0.133** -0.115 -0.122* -0.137**
(0.073) (0.059) (0.051) (0.079) (0.064) (0.056)
Constant -6.964*** -3.244** -0.850 -6.464*** -2.858** -0.529
(1.815) (1.410) (1.271) (1.792) (1.355) (1.235)
Hansen-J (p) - - - 0.467 0.253 0.213
Turning point, log-level 13.241 - - 12.566 - -
Turning point, level 563 149 - - 286 540 - -
R2 0.641 0.752 0.786 0.639 0.751 0.786
N 390 390 390 390 390 390
Table C.2: Economy-wide OLS results with squared income term.
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(1) FE (2) IV-FE
prod. fin.prod. cons. prod. fin.prod. cons.
ln(Income) -0.276 0.066 -0.081 -0.249 0.258 0.007
(0.699) (0.609) (0.831) (0.590) (0.746) (1.015)
ln(Income), squared 0.036 0.011 0.022 0.036 -0.001 0.017
(0.042) (0.036) (0.049) (0.036) (0.045) (0.061)
Annex I -0.044* 0.051* 0.075* -0.089 0.066 0.090
(0.023) (0.027) (0.041) (0.090) (0.084) (0.098)
Openness 0.085 0.064 0.013 0.089 0.066 0.014
(0.063) (0.083) (0.108) (0.066) (0.082) (0.106)
ln(Pop. density) -0.041 -0.179 -0.083 -0.092 -0.149 -0.045
(0.154) (0.202) (0.261) (0.199) (0.218) (0.284)
Food exports 0.000 -0.055 -0.155 -0.006 -0.019 -0.130
(0.197) (0.173) (0.252) (0.187) (0.176) (0.271)
Fuel exports 0.040 -0.227* -0.004 0.015 -0.226* -0.001
(0.085) (0.126) (0.189) (0.094) (0.132) (0.195)
Urbanization 0.688 0.946* 1.003 0.572 0.973 1.026
(0.504) (0.566) (0.633) (0.535) (0.625) (0.695)
Polity IV 0.005* 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Fossil rents 0.358 0.106 0.159 0.245 0.133 0.194
(0.299) (0.330) (0.407) (0.327) (0.353) (0.421)
HDI middle -0.002 0.007 0.040 -0.017 0.009 0.045
(0.055) (0.061) (0.079) (0.053) (0.063) (0.081)
HDI high 0.039 0.073 0.142* 0.013 0.079 0.148*
(0.062) (0.067) (0.085) (0.062) (0.070) (0.089)
HDI very high 0.043 0.080 0.168* 0.004 0.082 0.167
(0.073) (0.082) (0.097) (0.071) (0.086) (0.102)
2001 -0.060*** -0.030 -0.037 -0.054*** -0.031 -0.041
(0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.025) (0.032)
2004 -0.108*** -0.053 -0.083* -0.082 -0.061 -0.094
(0.037) (0.034) (0.048) (0.061) (0.060) (0.076)
2007 -0.175*** -0.105** -0.155** -0.147* -0.110 -0.166
(0.056) (0.051) (0.070) (0.079) (0.079) (0.103)
2011 -0.198*** -0.121* -0.186** -0.167* -0.127 -0.198*
(0.069) (0.061) (0.081) (0.096) (0.091) (0.119)
Hansen-J (p) - - - 0.222 0.240 0.254
R2 0.217 0.203 0.183 - - -
R2 within - - - 0.204 0.197 0.179
N 390 390 390 390 390 390
Table C.3: Economy-wide FE results including squared income term. Note: R2 within refers to
within country.
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C.3 Sectoral FE results
Tables C.4 to C.6 summarize the linear and polynomial sectoral results for CH4 produc-
tion, final production, and consumption inventories, respectively. They correspond to the
threshold tables 6 to 8 in the main text of the paper. The results are largely similar to
the results of the threshold models reported in the main text. The inverse-U relationship
between income and CH4 embodied in final production of and consumption from the man-
ufacturing sector is driven by few observations with extreme values (identified as outliers
via box plots). When dropping these observations (Mozambique in 1997 and 2001 for CH4
consumption, and additionally Uganda in 1997 for final production) both income terms
turn statistically insignificant for the final production inventory, and for the consumption
inventory the squared income term turns insignificant.
IV-FE prod. (linear and polynomial specifications)
agr liv egy mfc ser trn wab
ln(Income) 0.343* 0.005 0.877*** 0.719*** -0.543 14.984** 0.471**
(0.203) (0.149) (0.330) (0.174) (0.662) (7.576) (0.189)
ln(Income), squared -0.773*
(0.427)
Annex I 0.088 0.365 -0.367** 0.042 0.644** -0.527 -0.179**
(0.146) (0.283) (0.145) (0.150) (0.301) (0.489) (0.074)
Openness 0.197*** 0.631* 0.267 0.199* -0.499 0.297 0.012
(0.075) (0.376) (0.164) (0.114) (0.325) (0.311) (0.053)
Food exports 1.403**
(0.640)
Fossil rents -2.272*
(1.164)
Polity IV -0.018*
(0.010)
HDI medium 0.893**
(0.451)
HDI high 1.466***
(0.565)
HDI very high 1.608**
(0.640)
Hansen-J (p) 0.257 0.983 0.138 0.286 0.681 0.334 0.274
Turning point (ln) - - - - - 9.695 -
Turning point - - - - - 16 241 -
R2 within 0.052 0.015 0.128 0.374 0.034 0.214 0.112
N 390 390 390 390 390 390 390
Table C.4: Linear and polynomial sectoral results for CH4 production. Note: IV-FE results
(specifications include only statistically significant and baseline regressors). agr. stands for agriculture,
liv. for livestock, egy. for energy, mfc. for manufacturing, ser. for services, trn. for transport, and pub.
for public administration (see Table B.2). R2 within stands for R2 within country.
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IV-FE final production (linear and polynomial specifications)
agr liv egy mfc serv trn wab
ln(Income) 0.342 0.015 0.286 4.563** 0.115 1.109*** 0.415***
(0.251) (0.172) (0.361) (2.099) (0.341) (0.385) (0.097)
ln(Income), squared -0.206*
(0.118)
Annex I 0.589*** -0.174 -0.305* -0.004 0.267** 0.491** -0.126
(0.164) (0.154) (0.170) (0.155) (0.128) (0.203) (0.077)
Openness -0.280* 0.106 -0.001 0.347*** -0.049 0.087 0.128
(0.162) (0.092) (0.211) (0.078) (0.149) (0.197) (0.098)
Food exports 1.165***
(0.279)
Fuel exports 0.665** -1.383** -0.707* -1.902**
(0.267) (0.580) (0.377) (0.780)
HDI medium 0.192 0.224**
(0.121) (0.100)
HDI high 0.318* 0.388***
(0.193) (0.146)
HDI very high 0.255 0.288
(0.243) (0.193)
Hansen-J (p) 0.553 0.233 0.267 0.404 0.280 0.115 0.287
Turning point - - - 11.065 - - -
Turning point (PPP) - - - 63 876 - - -
R2 within 0.157 0.164 0.165 0.162 0.282 0.319 0.114
N 390 390 390 390 390 390 390
Table C.5: Linear and polynomial sectoral results for CH4 final production. Note: IV-FE results
(specifications include only statistically significant and baseline regressors). agr. stands for agriculture,
liv. for livestock, egy. for energy, mfc. for manufacturing, ser. for services, trn. for transport, and pub.
for public administration (see Table B.2). R2 within stands for R2 within country.
Tables C.7 to C.13 report the sectoral FE and IV-FE results for the full set of covariates
with and without the squared income term. In most sectors the squared income term is
statistically insignificant. Exceptions apply (for some specifications) to CH4 production
in the energy, service, and transport sectors, and for final production and consumption in
the manufacturing sector. For the energy and service sectors the statistical significance
of the squared income term vanishes when accounting for the the potential endogeneity
of income. The same is true for CH4 embodied in final production in the manufacturing
sector. For consumption inventories in the manufacturing sector the inverse-U relationship
is driven by two outlying observations (Mozambique in 1997 and 2001), whose deletion
leads to insignificant income terms. For these sectors we omit the squared terms from the
main analysis. The two statistically significant income terms for production inventories
in the transport sector imply an inverse-U shaped relationship between income and CH4
production.
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IV-FE cons. (linear and polynomial specifications)
agr liv egy mfc serv trn wab
ln(Income) 0.452** 0.065 0.244 4.955*** 0.136 1.411*** 0.392***
(0.187) (0.206) (0.478) (1.587) (0.349) (0.414) (0.103)
ln(Income), squared -0.227**
(0.090)
Annex I 0.664*** -0.307* -0.046 0.087 0.285** 0.574*** -0.182**
(0.135) (0.160) (0.227) (0.118) (0.123) (0.179) (0.089)
Openness 0.006 0.017 -0.074 0.065 -0.055 -0.048 0.122
(0.120) (0.121) (0.247) (0.103) (0.169) (0.202) (0.093)
Food exports 1.279***
(0.317)
Fuel exports 0.503* -2.214***
(0.270) (0.851)
ln(Population density) 1.322*
(0.791)
Polity IV 0.007*
(0.004)
HDI medium 0.168 0.341 0.265***
(0.129) (0.230) (0.102)
HDI high 0.369* 0.565* 0.433***
(0.193) (0.296) (0.149)
HDI very high 0.303 0.613* 0.375**
(0.226) (0.329) (0.190)
Hansen-J (p) 0.320 0.139 0.233 0.314 0.290 0.090 0.206
Turning point (ln) - - - 10.907 - - -
Turning point - - - 54 560 - - -
R2 within 0.181 0.080 0.249 0.263 0.254 0.306 0.092
N 390 390 390 390 390 390 390
Table C.6: Linear and polynomial sectoral results for CH4 consumption. Note: IV-FE results
(specifications include only statistically significant and baseline regressors). agr. stands for agriculture,
liv. for livestock, egy. for energy, mfc. for manufacturing, ser. for services, trn. for transport, and pub.
for public administration (see Table B.2). R2 within stands for R2 within country.
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